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Information Content of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosures in Europe: An Institutional Perspective 
 
ABSTRACT 
For a sample of STOXX Europe-600 constituents and a reporting period of nine years, we 
investigate the role of the institutional environment on the value relevance of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures in firms’ annual reports. Using textual analysis, we construct 
topic-specific disclosures measures that examine the prevalence of CSR topics with respect to 
the EU CSR directive, namely environmental, social and employee matters, human rights, and 
anti-corruption and bribery. The results reveal the value relevance of CSR disclosures, 
although the sign depends on the regulatory setting; it is positive before the issuance of the 
CSR directive and negative after it. Furthermore our results indicate that the incremental 
value relevance of topic-specific CSR disclosure is affected by the institutional environment, 
specifically, it is negatively related to country-level CSR awareness as well as employee 
protection and positively related to both, the legal strength and the level of enforcement. Our 
results also vary depending by the underlying topics. 
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“ENCOURAGE COMPANIES, ESPECIALLY LARGE AND TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES, TO ADOPT 
SUSTAINABLE PRACTICES AND TO INTEGRATE SUSTAINABILITY INFORMATION INTO THEIR 
REPORTING CYCLE IN ORDER TO ENABLE IN THE LONG RUN SUSTAINABLE FINANCING.” 
(UN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS, TARGET 12.6) 
1. Introduction 
There is no question that corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting has become more 
important over the last decades on the company level (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995) , but it 
has also gained increased attention from policy makers, such as the European Union, and the 
SEC. Aiming to trigger change towards a more sustainable economy, the issuance of directive 
2014/95/EU (CSR directive) (European Parliament, 2014) has established an important step 
towards mandatory CSR reporting. The real effects of this regulation have already been 
confirmed by recent studies (Fiechter, Hitz, & Lehmann, 2017; Grewal, Riedl, & Serafeim, 
2017).  
Despite these increasing regulatory actions/efforts, the question of whether and how CSR 
disclosures is related to firm value is neither theoretically nor empirically clear. On the one 
hand, voluntary CSR disclosures is expected to be positively related to firm value because of 
an information effect through reduced information asymmetry and a stewardship effect 
through increased monitoring by shareholders (Core, Hail, & Verdi, 2015; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). However, the direct effect 
depends on the value-relevance of CSR activities per se. In that respect, CSR activities might 
be positively related to firm value as postulated by the “business case of sustainability”. On 
the other hand, CSR activities might cater to stakeholders at the expense of shareholders, and 
thereby generate a detrimental effect on firm value. Not surprisingly, empirical evidence on 
the relationship between CSR disclosures and firm valuation is mixed with some studies 
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revealing a positive relationship (e.g. Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2016; 
Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014), and other studies revealing 
a negative relationship (e.g. Richardson and Welker, 2001; Ullmann, 1985; Vance, 1975). 
One potential reason for these mixed findings might be the variety of different measures of 
CSR disclosures that prior studies apply. These measures range from the mere issuance of 
stand-alone CSR reports (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; 
Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012) to measures that relate to the quality and/or 
quantity of CSR disclosures based on content analyses and hand-collected data (Clarkson, 
Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013; Lu, Shailer, & Yu, 2016; Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 
2015; Richardson and Welker, 2001) or proprietary data (e.g. Cahan et al., 2016; Gao, Dong, 
Ni, & Fu, 2015).  
 
Another potential reason for the inconsistent findings relates to the institutional environment 
in the context of CSR disclosures. Evidence suggests that the institutional environment plays 
an important role in the value-relevance of disclosures (e.g.,Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hope, 2003; 
Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Specifically, the “incentive-based” view on reporting posits 
that the institutional environment provides certain incentives for firm disclosures that need to 
be considered when studying the value-relevance of disclosures. This conception is also 
confirmed by the few empirical studies that investigate the role of the institutional 
environment in the value relevance of CSR disclosure. However, the direction of this 
relationship is currently unclear which primarily stems from differences in the measure of the 
institutional environment. For instance, Cahan et al. (2016) aggregate variables that proxy for 
the legal environment as well as CSR awareness into a single factor. The authors find a 
negative relationship with firm value, thereby indicating that CSR disclosures is less value 
relevant in countries with a stronger institutional environment. However, due to the broadness 
of the measure, the different effects cannot be disentangled. Contrary to Cahan et al. (2016), 
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Dhaliwal et al. (2014); Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find a value-increasing effect of a strong CSR 
environment.  
 
Against the background of these mixed findings, this study aims to investigate how the 
institutional environment shapes the inclusion of CSR topics in annual reports. We therefore 
follow a two-step approach. First, we analyze the value-relevance of topic-specific CSR 
disclosures based on a nested Ohlson (1995) model, investigating the influence of CSR 
disclosures on share price. In addition, we control for the issuance of the CSR directive in this 
model. Contrary to the majority of the existing studies, we construct topic-specific CSR 
disclosures measures based on a methodology recently introduced by Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015) and Hummel, Mittelbach-Hoermanseder, Cho, & Matten (2017). 
Therefore, we rely on topics requested by the CSR directive, namely, environmental matters, 
social matters, employee matters, human rights, corruption and bribery. For each CSR topic, 
we search the annual reports for a search term and extract twenty-word-windows around 
every search term to automatically derive valid topic vocabularies, resulting in six distinct 
topic vocabularies. By focusing on specific CSR disclosures topics, we are able to enlighten 
the prior mixed empirical evidence, which is especially scarce for investigating separate 
topics (except for Bernardi and Stark (2018); Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) in the context of 
firm valuation and recently Cannon, Ling, Wang, & Watanabe (2017) for firm’s competitive 
advantages).  
 
Second, we examine how the institutional environment relates to the value-relevance of CSR 
disclosures. Based on prior studies (Cahan et al., 2016; De Villiers and Marques, 2016; 
Ernstberger, Krotter, & Stadler, 2008; Isidro and Marques, 2015; Leuz et al., 2003; Wang and 
Yu, 2015), we focus on four different institutional factors, CSR awareness, employee 
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protection, legal environment and enforcement, thereby extending the prior studies’ evidence 
on the role of the institutional environment in general.  
 
For a sample of firms listed on the STOXX Europe 600 index in the reporting period 2008-
2016 our results reveal that all the topic-specific CSR disclosures are value-relevant; however, 
the coefficients vary depending on the regulatory setting. Specifically, all the topics reveal a 
negative and significant relationship for the year 2014, when the CSR directive was issued, 
and later. For the period before, where the characteristics of a purely voluntary setting apply 
and companies can differentiate themselves from others through their voluntary disclosure, 
we find a positive relationship, significant for social matters, human rights and corruption. 
Our bivariate findings also provide evidence that the disclosure of the topics is often 
accompanied by the disclosure of the other considered topics in annual reports. 
In line with previous literature we also account for the issuance of a separate CSR report; 
however, the issuance of a standalone CSR report is not significant and our results remain 
unchanged. Thus, the considerations of the mere publication of a CSR report provides only 
limited insights.  Also, we include textual characteristics, such as readability and tone; both of 
the measures do not exhibit any significance, indicating the importance of our approach to 
using topic-specific measures. 
The results from the second step provide evidence that the incremental value-relevance of the 
CSR topics is indeed shaped by the institutional environment and that our four factors grasp 
different country-level institutional aspects. We find that the CSR awareness of a country has 
a negative and significant relationship with all topic-specific CSR disclosures, revealing that 
the importance of CSR disclosures is limited if a country already exhibits a certain level of 
CSR awareness. The same finding applies to our factor measuring employee protection. The 
result is consistent with Matten and Moon (2008) implicit-explicit framework. Specifically, in 
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countries with higher CSR awareness and stronger employee protections, CSR disclosures 
become more implicit and thus less value relevant. Both the legal environment and the level 
of enforcement exhibit a positive relationship for some of the topics. It is significant for 
human rights, corruption and bribery for the factor measuring the strength of the legal 
environment and all the topics, except for corruption and bribery, for the level of enforcement. 
This finding is in line with Dhaliwal et al. (2014); (2012). Thus, in countries with stronger 
legal environments and enforcement, the reliability of the disclosed information is higher.  
However, it varies depending on the topic. For the topics with lower similarity scores, the 
legal strength is significant, and for those with higher scores it is the level of enforcement.  
Bearing in mind that prior literature suggests a relationship between CSR performance and 
disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; Hummel and Schlick, 2016), we also 
control for CSR performance; our results indicate that an inclusion in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI) has a positive effect on the incremental value relevance of CSR 
disclosure whereas the continuous asset 4 score is not significant. We do not find any 
evidence that this relationship differs depending on the CSR performance of the respective 
company.  
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, with respect to the institutional 
environment, the recent literature has mainly concentrated on one or two (partially manually) 
aggregated factors (Cahan et al., 2016; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). In 
contrast, we perform a principal component analysis of all our variables and develop four 
distinct factors measuring different institutional characteristics on the country level. Our 
results show that the distinct factors are variously related to the incremental value relevance 
of CSR disclosures. Thus, we are able to disentangle the theoretical reasoning of the role of 
the institutional environment on the value relevance into CSR awareness and employee 
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protection that is attributable to an information effect as well as legal strength and 
enforcement resulting from a stewardship effect.  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the first to investigate the value 
relevance of topic-specific CSR disclosures. Except for the studies provided by Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2017) and Bernardi and Stark (2018), there are currently no studies that 
simultaneously investigate the value relevance of different CSR disclosures topics. Prior 
studies are often restricted to environmental, social or overall sustainability disclosures, but 
do not provide insights into the value relevance of different CSR topics. This is even more 
surprising considering Plumlee et al. (2015) find that, when splitting their disclosures measure 
into nature and type, their results become more precise. Within our nested regression models, 
we do not only consider whether specific topics were addressed, but also account for how 
they were addressed. We do so by comparing every annual report to our automatically 
generated topic-specific vocabularies and come up with similarity scores, measuring how 
close the annual report is to the respective topic vocabulary. Moreover, none of the existing 
value relevance studies focus on the disclosures of CSR information in firms’ annual reports, 
although annual reports are the major disclosures channel for firms to communicate with 
capital market participants (Amernic, 1992; Anderson and Epstein, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002; 
Salancik and Meindl, 1984). Since we derive our topics from the CSR directive, which is not 
industry specific but has a broad circle of users, our results also have the advantage of 
generalizability and thus, are easily transferable. 
 
Third, the use of textual analysis enables us to overcome some of the weaknesses of prior 
studies, particularly the use of aggregated (often proprietary) CSR disclosures scores in large 
sample settings or small sample sizes in case of manual content analyses. Because the 
analyses are derived by computational textual analysis, they are, in large part, independent of 
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any judgment and easily replicable to apply those measures to other samples and provide 
comparable research. To make use of the advantages of textual analysis and allow for further 
comparative research, we also contribute to future research by providing our word lists with 
respect to the six topics mandated by the CSR directive.  
Fourth, there is also concern that CSR disclosures are highly time-driven, and thus, one-year 
studies such as Cahan et al. (2016) only provide limited evidence. Because we perform a 
longitudinal study over a horizon of nine years together with topic-specific CSR disclosures 
we are able to provide more robust evidence. Specifically, our results reveal that the inclusion 
of time-fixed effects is important. 
Finally we are also among the first studies to respond to the call by Leuz and Wysocki (2016) 
to investigate the value relevance of nontraditional disclosures. 
Therefore, our contribution is manifold. Additionally, we further provide evidence to 
practitioners (especially preparers) to understand, how topic-specific CSR disclosures affect 
capital markets. Specifically we show that CSR disclosures are negatively related to price 
after the issuance of the CSR directive and the impact on the explanatory power of 
supplementary CSR disclosures by topic is negatively related to a country’s CSR awareness 
and employee protection. Thus, in such settings preparers would need to put less emphasis on 
explicit reporting. However the legal strength and enforcement generally increase the 
explanatory power. Additionally, with respect to further advances in mandatory CSR 
reporting for small- and medium-sized companies, we provide evidence for standard setters 
that, despite uniform standards, the processing of the information content of topic-specific 
disclosures by capital markets may be driven by different aspects of the institutional 
environment and thus should be considered.  
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This paper is structured as follows. First, we present the institutional background relating to 
the CSR directive and a review of the literature, followed by the theoretical background and 
the development of the hypotheses. Next, the research design is described, particularly the 
empirical model, the sampling, the topic-specific disclosures measures and the measurement 
of the institutional environment. The descriptive and multivariate findings as well as insights 
from additional robustness tests are then presented. The final section draws together the main 
findings and concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Prior Literature 
2.1 CSR Directive 
It was only in April 2014 that the European Union passed a directive mandating the 
“disclosures of non-financial and diversity information” for large companies from 2017 
onwards (2014/95/EU). The directive specifically aims at firms listed on EU exchanges or 
with significant operations within the EU, which are defined as large or public-interest entities 
(PIEs) by EU member states due to their activities, size or number of employees1. Article one 
of the CSR directive states that companies shall report, either in the management report a 
nonfinancial statement or a separate nonfinancial report, thematic aspects relating, at a 
minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery matters.  
                                                          
1 The disclosures requirements for non-financial information apply to certain large companies with more than 
500 employees, as the cost of obliging small and medium-sized enterprises to apply them could outweigh the 
benefits. 
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This nonfinancial information should lead to more robust growth and employment and 
increased trust among stakeholders, including investors and consumers 2 . However, the 
directive neither requires the application of one single standardized CSR framework nor 
assurance by an auditor. The directive only specifies that firms may prepare their CSR 
disclosures based on high quality, broadly recognized national, EU-based or international 
frameworks and that an auditor should check that the nonfinancial information was provided. 
Thus, the directive has been criticized because the guidelines are still not specific enough and 
provide companies too much room for flexibility. At the same time, the publication of the 
directive has also been seen as an important milestone towards signaling the importance of 
sustainability for the EU.  
Regardless of its criticism, the recent literature shows that the publication of the CSR 
directive has already been economically significant. Specifically, Grewal et al. (2017) finds 
that the announcement of the directive has led to a negative market reaction, confirming the 
importance of its implications for equity investors. The authors also show that the reaction 
depends on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score; disclosures is more (less) 
pronounced for weak (strong) ESG-performing firms. Furthermore, Fiechter et al. (2017) 
show that the issuance of the CSR directive has led to increased CSR activities among 
affected firms that did not report prior to the directive. 
2.2 Prior Literature  
We organize the literature investigating the information content of CSR disclosures in two 
streams. In the first strand, we discuss studies that focus on the value relevance of CSR 
disclosures. The second strand relates to studies that address the value relevance of CSR 
disclosures in the context of the institutional environment.  
                                                          
2 Communication from the commission, guidelines on non-financial reporting (methodology for reporting non-
financial information) 2017/C 215/01, European Commission (2017). 
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Among the first studies on the value-relevance of CSR disclosures are the studies provided by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012). Using a US sample, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) 
show that firms with higher costs of equity are more likely to release a separate CSR report 
and that first-time reporters can decrease their cost of equity capital in subsequent years. A 
subsequent study that focuses on a worldwide sample reveals that the publication of a stand-
alone CSR report is associated with lower earnings forecast errors, i.e., higher analysts’ 
earnings accuracy (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). Other studies focus not only on the issuance of a 
separate CSR report but also on the quantity or quality of the disclosed CSR information. 
These studies tend to support the value-enhancing effects of CSR disclosures. For instance, 
both Clarkson et al. (2013) and Plumlee et al. (2015) focus on environmental disclosures and 
reveal negative associations with firms’ cost of equity capital (Clarkson et al., 2013) and 
positive associations with expected future cash flows (Plumlee et al., 2015). Similarly, Gao et 
al. (2015) find that high-quality CSR disclosures have greater analyst coverage, a higher level 
of institutional ownership and greater stock liquidity, with all of these resulting in a higher 
valuation in equity offerings and a lower cost of debt. Only early evidence from Richardson 
and Welker (2001) find evidence for a value-decreasing effect of CSR disclosures, 
specifically social disclosures for a sample of 124 Canadian firms. These studies are 
complemented by a few studies that focus on CSR disclosures in a mandatory setting (Barth, 
Cahan, Chen, & Venter, 2017; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). Specifically, Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2017) focus on mandatory CSR disclosures in four countries and find a positive and 
significant relationship for the overall Bloomberg ESG disclosures score with firm value, as 
well as for the environmental, social, and governance disclosures scores separately. Similarly, 
Barth et al. (2017) examine the relationship between integrated report quality and firm value 
in South Africa, where integrated reporting is mandatory. Their results reveal positive and 
significant associations between integrated report quality and firm value, via both a capital 
market channel and a real effects channel. 
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The second stream of studies specifically examines the role of the institutional environment in 
the context of financial and CSR disclosures. While there is extensive research with regard to 
financial disclosures (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Core et al., 2015; Francis, Nanda, & 
Olsson, 2008; Gaio, 2010; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Isidro and Marques, 2015; Leuz et al., 2003; 
Wang and Yu, 2015), in the context of CSR disclosures, this research is still in its beginning 
and comprises only a limited number of studies (Cahan et al., 2016; De Villiers and Marques, 
2016; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Chua, 2009). With 
respect to CSR disclosures per se, the empirical evidence suggests that firms that are 
domiciled in stakeholder-oriented countries provide higher levels of CSR disclosures (Kolk 
and Perego, 2010; Simnett et al., 2009; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005). 
With respect to the value relevance of CSR disclosures, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) investigate 
under which institutional setting CSR disclosures improves analyst forecast accuracy. For 
7,108 firm-year observations from 1994 to 2007, their finding that the publication of a stand-
alone CSR report is associated with lower earnings forecast errors is even more pronounced 
for countries that are more stakeholder-oriented and for companies with greater opacity in 
their financial disclosures. Considering the same cross-country setting, Dhaliwal et al. (2014), 
find the same phenomenon for cost of capital. The negative association between the issuance 
of a stand-alone CSR report and the cost of equity capital is also more pronounced for 
stakeholder-oriented countries. Thus, their results indicate that the relevance of the same type 
of disclosures for investors depends on the business culture and the institutional environment.  
More recently, in a cross-country setting including 21 countries, Cahan et al. (2016) examine 
the relationship between overall CSR disclosures and firm value for 676 firms for 2008. 
Based on a proprietary CSR disclosures proxy provided by KPMG they confirm a positive 
association between firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, and CSR disclosures only for the 
unexpected and not the expected part of the disclosures. Furthermore, the authors’ results 
13 
 
reveal that the expected CSR disclosures is significantly positively associated with the 
strength of the country-level institutions. Specifically, they show that under transparent 
conditions, unexpected CSR disclosures tend to be less incrementally informative than those 
in countries with weak institutions. Note that this finding is contrary to Dhaliwal et al. (2014); 
(2012). Similarly, for using a cross-country value relevance study, De Villiers and Marques 
(2016) confirm a positive relationship between the CSR disclosures level/quality and the 
strength of the institutional environment. Specifically the authors examine a sample of 366 
European firms across four years based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reporting 
level and find a positive and significant association between CSR disclosures and share price. 
De Villiers and Marques (2016) show that this relationship is more pronounced in countries 
with stronger governance mechanisms – which is a finding that is contrary to the finding 
obtained by Cahan et al. (2016).  
Taken together, the results tend to show that CSR disclosures provides additional information 
to the market. In addition, there is some empirical evidence revealing that the value relevance 
of CSR disclosures depend on the strength of the institutional environment (Cahan et al., 
2016; De Villiers and Marques, 2016; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). However, 
the empirical evidence regarding the direction of the effect of the institutional environment is 
still mixed.  
3. Empirical Predictions and Hypotheses 
3.1 Value Relevance of CSR Disclosures 
Economic theory predicts that increased voluntary disclosures has a positive impact on firm 
value through two channels: i) an information effect that reduces information asymmetry, 
increases awareness of the firm’s existence and enlarges the investor base or increased 
liquidity (Healy and Palepu, 2001), which is largely confirmed for financial disclosures (Leuz 
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and Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), and ii) a stewardship effect because of 
increased monitoring of the manager by the shareholders. In the context of CSR disclosures, 
the information effect is ex ante not that clear, which primarily stems from opposing views on 
the value relevance of CSR activities per se. 3  These opposing theoretical predictions 
regarding the relationship between CSR disclosures and firm valuation are also reflected in 
prior studies’ mixed empirical evidence. 
On the one hand, CSR activities might be positively related to firm value due to competitive 
advantages (Cannon et al., 2017); increased sales volumes – particularly among high-quality 
customers (Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010); better reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990); and higher innovation and operational efficiency (Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, 
Ellstrand, & Romi, 2013). This line of reasoning is often referred to as the “business case of 
sustainability”. On the other hand, the view exists that CSR activities cater to stakeholders at 
the expense of shareholders and thereby generate a detrimental effect on value by affecting a 
firm’s operations, for example reforming costs or production cost (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
A negative effect of costly CSR activities on financial performance is also confirmed by early 
evidence, e.g. Ullmann (1985); Vance (1975) or Peng and Yang (2014). Richardson and 
Welker (2001) find clear negative effects of costly CSR activities on financial performance,  
Against the background of these differences in the theoretical reasoning for CSR disclosures 
and the inconsistent empirical evidence, we assert that CSR disclosures convey information 
beyond that provided by financial disclosures, regardless of the aggregate valuation 
implication of CSR activities. However, in contrast to prior studies, we neither focus on the 
issuance of a separate CSR report nor an overall CSR disclosures level, but instead examine 
the disclosures of topic-specific CSR information in firms’ annual reports, as requested by the 
CSR directive. We concentrate on the annual report since it is the main public document 
                                                          
3 Note that also in the financial disclosures literature the relationship is not without controversy. For instance, 
Johnstone (2014) shows a value-decreasing effect of higher information precision.  
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presented by companies and, thus, has a significant influence on the way capital markets 
perceive information and react to the release of that information via a change in the share 
price (Amernic, 1992; Anderson and Epstein, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002; Salancik and Meindl, 
1984). Consistent with Plumlee et al. (2015), we assert that more granular CSR disclosure 
information should provide better evidence. Therefore, we are particularly interested in the 
information content of different topics of CSR information in firms’ annual reports. We are 
also convinced that this approach allows us to better grasp the CSR activities within the 
disclosures score. Specifically, we focus on those topics for which disclosures is requested by 
the CSR directive, namely, environmental matters, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, and anti-corruption and bribery matters. We formally posit the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Annual report disclosures on  
a) environmental matters,  
b) social and employee matters, 
c) human rights matters, and 
d) anti-corruption and bribery matters 
provide informational content to capital market participants that is in addition to 
financial information.  
The approach considering different topics at once is new, to our knowledge. Prior research 
typically focuses on aggregated measures of CSR disclosures, such as the issuance of a stand-
alone CSR report (2011, 2014; 2012) or an overall CSR disclosures score (Barth et al., 2017; 
Cahan et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2015; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). A few studies focus on 
only environmental disclosures (Clarkson et al., 2013; Cormier, Magnan, & van Velthoven, 
2005; Plumlee et al., 2015) or social disclosures (Richardson and Welker, 2001), showing that 
companies report differently based on the considered topic. With respect to environmental 
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matters, the literature shows that the impact of disclosures is often industry specific 
(Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-
Muñoz, 2014). With respect to firm value, empirical evidence tends to reveal a positive 
association (Clarkson et al., 2013; Cormier, Ledoux, & Magnan, 2011; Plumlee et al., 2015). 
For social and employee matters, the only study that focuses exclusively on social disclosures 
reveals a negative effect on firm value (Richardson and Welker, 2001). With respect to 
disclosures on human rights as well as corruption and bribery, these topics are not covered by 
prior studies. 
Recently, Ioannou and Serafeim (2017) and Bernardi and Stark (2018) separately investigated 
the three components of the Bloomberg ESG score. The former provide evidence for the value 
relevance of the three components; the latter investigate the relationship with accuracy of 
analyst forecasts and find that the relationship is particularly pronounced for environmental 
disclosures. The topic-specific approach we propose goes one step further by considering 
separate topics based on the CSR directive and by applying textual analysis. We expect to add 
new evidence to the literature, because as also Hummel et al. (2017); Matten and Moon 
(2008) show companies report differently with respect to topics depending on the institutional 
environment. 
3.2 The Role of the Institutional Environment 
There is extensive research showing that firm disclosures and potential economic 
consequences vary considerably depending on the institutional environment (Hail and Leuz, 
2006; Hope, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Wang and Yu, 2015). Specifically, the literature shows 
that institutional factors substantially shape firm’s reporting incentives (Ball, Kothari, & 
Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 
2006; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008, 2013; Leuz et al., 2003). Based on the prior 
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literature (Cahan et al., 2016; Core et al., 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; 
Wang and Yu, 2015), we focus on four institutional factors, namely, CSR awareness, 
employee protection, legal environment and enforcement.  
With respect to the role of CSR awareness and employee protection, the literature shows 
significant variation in voluntary CSR disclosures in cross-country settings (Chen and 
Bouvain, 2009; Fifka, 2013b; Kolk and Perego, 2010; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Orij, 2010; 
Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). Specifically, the evidence attributes an important influence 
to the institutional environment since it shapes the social and political process defining 
stakeholders’ interests (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). It is the 
incentives provided by a certain institutional framework that are crucial to the adoption of 
certain CSR-friendly behavior and reporting (Campbell and Slack, 2008; Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014).  However, theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the direction of 
the relationship between CSR-related institutional factors and the value relevance of CSR 
disclosures are mixed. On the one hand, one may argue that CSR disclosures in countries with 
strong CSR awareness and employee protection is more credible due to the stronger 
monitoring of firms’ CSR actions and disclosures by their stakeholders. For instance, CSR 
disclosures on employee matters might result in stricter consequences in countries with 
stronger employee protection. As a consequence, CSR disclosures is more value-relevant in 
these countries. Such a positive effect of the public awareness of CSR issues and employee 
protection is found by Dhaliwal et al. (2014); (2012). They find that the negative relationship 
between CSR disclosures and forecast error (Dhaliwal et al., 2012) or cost of capital 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2014) is more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries. On the other 
hand, one may also argue that there is a value-decreasing effect of a strong CSR-related 
institutional environment. Specifically, based on the national business systems approach (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Maurice and Sorge, 2000; Maurice, Sorge, & Warner, 1980), Matten and 
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Moon (2008) argue that firms located in liberal market economies (LMEs), such as the US, 
provide more explicit CSR disclosures because LMEs encourage corporate CSR actions due 
to weak governmental/regulatory CSR actions. Likewise, firms located in coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), such as most European countries, provide less explicit CSR disclosures 
because CMEs are characterized by extensive CSR regulations and governmental 
involvement. Empirical evidence tends to support this framework (Chen and Bouvain, 2009; 
Fifka, 2013a; Hummel et al., 2017; Maignan and Ralston, 2002). As a consequence, stronger 
regulatory CSR actions might decrease the value relevance of CSR disclosures since CSR 
disclosures and CSR actions are more implicit. Thus, CSR disclosures do not provide a means 
for companies to differentiate themselves from other firms since all companies are subject to 
the same regulations with respect to for instance employee protection. Such a negative 
relationship is found by Cahan et al. (2016); however, it should be noted that Cahan et al. 
(2016) focus on an aggregate measure of institutional strength. As a consequence, we do not 
know which of our four institutional factors drive this effect. Based on these mixed theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence, we posit a nondirectional hypothesis for the effect of CSR 
awareness and employee protection on the value relevance of CSR disclosures and formally 
posit the following: 
H2: The level of 
a) CSR awareness and 
b) employee protection 
of the respective country is related to the incremental value relevance of CSR 
disclosures. 
With respect to the legal environment and enforcement, theoretical and empirical evidence is 
also mixed. On the one hand, one might argue that the stewardship role of disclosures 
becomes less important in countries with a strong legal environment since such an 
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institutional environment itself can establish/guarantee alignment between shareholders and 
managers. In this case, disclosures and the legal environment act as substitutes. Empirical 
evidence for such a negative relationship is provided by Core et al. (2015), (2016) and 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012). On the other hand, one might argue that strong legal environments and 
enforcement provide stronger reporting incentives. Specifically, stronger legal systems have a 
negative effect / impede earnings management (Burgstahler et al., 2006; Jeanjean and 
Stolowy, 2008; Leuz et al., 2003) and foster the quality and effectiveness of accounting 
standards (Ball et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Wang and Yu, 2015). Thus, in strong legal 
environments, the reliability of the disclosed information is higher, which translates into 
higher firm valuations. This relationship is particularly true for voluntary disclosures since a 
strong legal environment reduces the discretion for opportunistic disclosures (legitimacy 
reasons). In this case, firms provide information if the marginal benefits of disclosures are 
equal to or higher than the marginal costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Empirical evidence for such a 
positive impact of the legal environment and enforcement on the value-relevance of 
disclosures is provided by Wang and Yu (2015). Again, we do not hypothesize on the 
direction of the relationship between the institutional environment and the value relevance of 
CSR disclosures. We therefore posit the following hypotheses: 
H2: The level of 
c) the legal environment and 
d) enforcement 
of the respective country is related to the incremental value relevance of CSR 
disclosures. 
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4. Research Design and Variables 
4.1 Empirical Model 
To assess how the institutional environment shapes the incremental value relevance of topic-
specific CSR disclosures in annual reports, we use a two-step procedure. First, we select the 
relevant CSR topics, by investigating which topics provide significant informational content 
to the capital market. Therefore, we analyze a traditional value-relevance model based on 
Ohlson (1995) and investigate whether the disclosures of topic-specific CSR information in 
the annual report is significant. Specifically, we run the following nested panel regressions 
with fixed effects for cross-sections and years: 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝜀𝜀    (1) 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2+𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8+𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ POST + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
Here, P denotes the share price of a certain company, BVE is the book value per share and 
EARN stands for the earnings per share. All the data refer to the fiscal year end. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 proxies the  
topic-specific CSR information in the annual report, namely, information on the environment 
(TENV), social matters (TSOC), employee matters (TEMPL), human rights (THR), corruption 
(TCORR) and bribery (TBRIB). To control for the issuance as well as the presence of the CSR 
directive, from which we extracted the topics, we include interaction terms of topic-specific 
CSR disclosures with POST. Here, POST denotes the presence of the CSR directive that was 
communicated to the market in 2014 and thus amounts to 1 for the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 
and zero otherwise.4 In doing so, we take into account the recent results concerning the real 
effects of the CSR directive (Fiechter et al., 2017; Grewal et al., 2017). We provide a list of 
all our variables in Appendix I. 
                                                          
4 Note that we do not include POST as additional variable because POST is perfectly correlated with the year-
fixed effects. 
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Second, in case the textual variables Ti exert a significant impact on prices, we continue to 
analyze the incremental value relevance of the respective CSR disclosures with respect to the 
institutional environment. Therefore, we first calculate the change in the explanatory power of 
the Ohlson (1995) model, incremental to the addition of topic-specific CSR information, 
given by 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) − 𝐸𝐸2 (𝐵𝐵) , where  𝐸𝐸2 (𝐵𝐵)  is the adjusted 𝐸𝐸2 of the baseline 
model (1) and 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) is the adjusted 𝐸𝐸2  after adding the topic-specific CSR disclosures 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 to 
the pooled regression model, both at the firm level5. The advantage of this comparison is that 
each (adjusted) 𝐸𝐸2  only considers the explanatory power of the topic-specific CSR 
disclosures for the dependent variable and enables us to consider the incremental information 
content on the stock price, P, by the CSR disclosures (Barth, Landsman, Lang, & Williams, 
2012). Next, to provide insights into how different institutional environments affect the 
information processing of how the additional topic-specific CSR disclosures convey new 
information and, thus, significantly influence the incremental 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖), we run the following 
regression model with country- and industry-fixed effects: 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) =  𝜇𝜇0 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀    (3) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 are the factors resulting from a principal component analysis (PCA) 
considering the strength of the institutional environment (see 4.4). Further analyses are the 
subject of our robustness tests. 
4.2 Sampling  
We concentrate on firms listed in the STOXX Europe 600 index as of October, 2016. Our 
unique dataset is based on the manual collection of the firms’ annual reports for the period 
ranging from 2008 to 2016, resulting in 5,023 annual reports.  
                                                          
5 We consider companies only where observations are available for the whole observation period, namely at least 
8 years.  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Panel A of Table 1 provides an overview of the sample selection process. In total, we obtain 
5,023 reports (i.e., firm-year observations) for our sample of 600 firms and 9 reporting years. 
As it is not possible to process 850 of the reports in the textual analysis for various reasons, 
our sample is reduced to 4,173 observations.6 We drop 212 observations due to missing 
values for the dependent variables. Our final sample consists of 3,961 observations for 
equations (1) and (2). For equation (3) the sample is reduced to 3,303 observations because 
we request at least 8 observations per firm in order to enter the pooled regressions. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by industry group based on Fama and 
French (2017). Panel C of Table 1 provides the sample distribution by country. 
4.3 Topic-specific CSR Disclosure Measures 
To generate a CSR disclosures measure with respect to different CSR topics, we use textual 
analysis. Specifically, prior research in financial reporting provides evidence for a positive 
relationship between the readability of a firm’s financial disclosures and market efficiency 
(Biddle, Hilary, & Verdi, 2009; Li, 2008; Miller, 2010). In addition, Lehavy, Li, & Merkley 
(2011) show that readability is negatively correlated with analyst following. Thus, CSR 
disclosures measured through textual components convey new information beyond that 
included in financial disclosures. To overcome the main caveats of CSR disclosures research, 
in particular small sample sizes, limited replicability and intercoder reliability in the case of 
manual disclosures assessments, and limited transparency in the case of proprietary data, we 
                                                          
6 Files that cannot be processed in the textual analysis are typically PDF files with copy protection. 
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apply computer-assisted textual analysis and calculate topic-specific CSR disclosures 
measures. 
Specifically, we expect CSR disclosures measured through textual components to convey new 
information beyond that included in financial disclosures. Recently, the use of textual analysis 
to assess CSR disclosures has arisen (e.g. Cannon et al., 2017; Loughran, McDonald, & Yun, 
2009; Melloni, Caglio, & Perego, 2017). Those studies often refer to textual characteristics, 
such as readability, tone, optimism or certainty and text length (Cho et al., 2010; Melloni et 
al., 2017; Muslu, Mutlu, Radhakrishnan, & Tsang, 2016; Nazari, Hrazdil, & Mahmoudian, 
2017). Few studies assess CSR disclosures with respect to specific topics. For instance, 
Loughran et al. (2009) examine the use of ethics-related terms in 10-K reports and use a 
binary variable that reflects the occurrence of ethics-related terms. A greater number of CSR 
topics are examined by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016) and Cannon et al. (2017). Based on 10-K 
reports the authors construct word lists that cover different areas of CSR. Topic-specific CSR 
disclosures are then measured as the frequency of the respective words in each report. The 
problem with such word lists is that they usually comprise a considerable number of words 
with ambiguous meanings that confound the validity of the measurement. Hummel et al. 
(2017) introduce a procedure to measure topic-specific CSR disclosures that draws on Hoberg 
and Maksimovic (2015). Instead of using simple word-count-based measures, they rely on the 
cosine similarity between each report and an automatically generated topic-specific 
vocabulary.  
Our construction of topic-specific CSR disclosures measures follows the procedures 
introduced by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and Hummel et al. (2017). Specifically, we 
measure the similarity of each annual report with respect to different CSR topics defined by 
the CSR directive and the corresponding guidelines for nonfinancial reporting (2017/C 
2015/01). Our procedure is the following: For each annual report in our sample, we capture to 
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what extent the report covers each of the following six topics: “environment”, “social 
matters”, “employee matters”, “human rights”, “anti-corruption” and “bribery”. 7  For each 
topic, we define a relevant search term that directly relates to the respective topics. 
Specifically, we use “ecology”8 for environmental matters (TENV), “social” for social matters 
(TSOC), “employee” for employee matters (TEMPL), “human right” for human rights (THR), 
“corruption” for anti-corruption (TCORR) and “bribery” for bribery (TBRIB). Next, we construct 
20-word windows around the search terms that comprise the 9 words directly before and the 
10 words directly after the search term.9 For each topic, we retrieve all the word windows that 
appear in the sample annual reports and aggregate them into topic vocabularies. We do this by 
using a common weighting term from the literature, term frequency inverse document 
frequency (tf-idf); see for instance Loughran and McDonald (2011, p. 1208; 2016). We then 
calculate the cosine similarity between the text in each annual report and our topic 
vocabularies to measure how similar (close) the report’s vocabulary is to each topic-specific 
vocabulary. The cosine similarity is used to find similarities between pairs of documents 
(Crossno, Wilson, Shead, & Dunlavy, 2011, p. 937) and is calculated as the inner product of 
two vectors, one describing the word usage in the annual report and the other describing the 
word usage in the topic vocabulary. This method compares the relative word frequencies 
across documents with score ranges between zero and one; if the score is one, the documents 
have the identical proportion of words, and if the score is zero, the documents have no 
similarities (Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 2015, pp. 113, 131). Thus, the higher the value of our 
CSR disclosures measure, the closer the reference document is to the topic-specific 
vocabulary. To compare different documents, cosine similarity has also been recently adopted 
                                                          
7 Another approach to defining the CSR-related topics is to use the latent dirichlet allocation (LDA) (e.g. A. 
Huang, Lehavy, Zang, & Zheng (2017)) to extract the topics from the annual reports. We experimented with the 
LDA, but the prevalence of CSR topics in annual reports was still too low to generate more than one distinct 
CSR-related topic. 
8 We also considered the term “environmental” but as our word lists reveals, the term is too broad in a company-
context. 
9 In the case of THR, the word windows comprise the 9 words that appear before and the 9 words that appear after 
the search term. 
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in the finance and accounting literature. Specifically for comparing different accounting 
standards such as US GAAP and IFRS (Loughran and McDonald, 2016, pp. 1214-1215) as 
well as different textual characteristics, such as the quantity of disclosures, boilerplate, 
readability, and comparability  between US and non-US firms’ annual reports (Lang and 
Stice-Lawrence, 2015, p. 131). 
 
Panel A of Table 2 provides an overview of the top twenty words in the retrieved twenty-
word windows thereby providing some intuition as to whether our word windows 
appropriately capture the respective topics. Based on the number of frequencies, the topic-
specific CSR disclosures measure with respect to social matters (TEMPL) is most prevalent in 
the annual reports of the sample firms. It appears to primarily relate to employee-related 
topics as well as the composition of the management and board. Similarly, the topic social 
matters (TSOC ) is also highly prevalent in the annual reports of the sample firms and appears 
to capture the social responsibility of the company. The frequency of the retrieved words for 
the topics human rights (THR) and corruption (TSOC) are rather similar. The topic THR appears 
to capture the discussion of human rights principles and policies in both the firm and the 
supply chain. The topics TCORR and TBRIB capture similar content, although the search term 
“corruption” is much more prevalent (18,136) in the annual reports than the search term 
“bribery” (7,334). Both topics refer to anti-corruption and anti-bribery risks, policies and 
codes of conduct including employee training and practices. The least frequent topic is 
ecology (TENV), which is discussed in the context of the environment and sustainable 
development. 10  Taken together, the retrieved words reveal that the topic vocabulary 
adequately captures the predefined topics.  Additionally, we provide some examples for the 
                                                          
10 A reason for the low occurrence could be the use of the search term “ecology”; however the term 
“environment” is too broad in the context of annual reports as our untabulated results confirm. 
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20-word windows in panel B. For a detailed description of the procedure to calculate the 
topic-specific disclosures measures, see Appendix II.11 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
We argue that the construction of topic-specific vocabularies based on word windows is valid 
(since it is based on a single, unambiguous search term), objective (no subjective definitions 
of search terms) and replicable.  
4.4 Institutional Environment 
We draw on prior studies to identify the institutional variables we expect to be related to how 
capital markets perceive CSR disclosures. Specifically, we focus on CSR awareness and 
employee protection to assess the relevance of CSR in a country, and we focus on the legal 
environment and enforcement to assess the regulatory environment of each country. We draw 
on prior studies to identify the relevant variables (Cahan et al., 2016; De Villiers and 
Marques, 2016; Ernstberger et al., 2008; Isidro and Marques, 2015; Leuz et al., 2003; Wang 
and Yu, 2015) and public CSR awareness (Cahan et al., 2016; Dhaliwal et al., 2011, 2014). 
Because several of these institutional variables are highly correlated with one another and thus 
cannot be simultaneously examined in a regression model, we perform a principal component 
analysis (PCA) with oblique Oblimin rotations12 to extract distinct factors. Additionally, the 
aggregation of the distinct score of the distinct measures has the advantage of capturing 
                                                          
11 Prior to the textual analysis, we apply various standard pre-processing methods to the text. Specifically, we 
eliminate certain characters and divide the text into single tokens. Next, we exclude all numbers, stop words and 
the names of the sample firms. Finally, we apply a stemming algorithm to collapse the words down to their word 
stem (Porter, 1980). These procedures enhance the comparability of the corpora. For the textual analyses, we use 
Python, in particular the gensim and nltk packages.  
12 Because the underlying theoretical model does not assume that the constructs are uncorrelated, the oblique 
rotation method is the most suitable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
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similarities. Appendix III provides an overview of the institutional variables entered into the 
PCA.13 
For all of our measures we use yearly scores (if available) and average them over the whole 
sample period of nine years. Furthermore we construct an aggregated measure factor_inst for 
our robustness tests and calculate the row mean above all four factors. 
The results from the PCA reveal four factors, which all have an eigenvalue greater than 1. Our 
first institutional variable (factor_csr) measures a country’s CSR awareness and society’s 
attitude towards CSR. Specifically, the factor comprises the variables sustainable 
development (Sust_Dev) measuring a country’s prioritization of sustainable development, the 
implementation of ethical practices (Eth_Pract), the perceived social responsibility of 
business leaders within a country (Soc_Resp) and the prioritization of environmental laws 
(Env_Laws). All four variables are retrieved from the IMD World Competitiveness Database 
(WCD) and based on annual surveys of executives’ opinions resulting in rankings of 
countries’ competitiveness in different areas, ranging from 0 to 10. Our second institutional 
variable (factor_empl) measures the country-specific importance of employee protection. The 
variable is comprised of the variables14 Empl_Law (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004), measuring a country’s employment laws; Coll_Law (Botero et al., 
2004), measuring a country’s collective relations laws; and an anti self dealing index (ASDI, 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008), measuring the private control of self-
dealing. All the variables range between 0 and 1. 
Our third institutional variable (factor_leg) captures a country’s legal environment and is 
determined by the following variables: Social security laws index (SoSec_Law), measuring 
the strength of a country’s social security systems and ranging from 0 to 1 (Botero et al., 
                                                          
13 For all our measures we use yearly scores (if available). 
14 For all variables a higher ranking indicates a better ranking, if not stated otherwise. 
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2004); human rights index (HRI), measuring a country’s human rights protection with  a 
range from 0 to 100  (Humana, 1992); Rule of law (Rule_Law), measuring the extent to which 
agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society (World Bank); voice and 
accountability (Voice_Acct), measuring the extent to which a country’s citizen are able to 
select their government (World Bank); government effectiveness (Gov_Eff), measuring the 
quality of public services and policies (World Bank); and regulatory quality (Reg_Qual), 
measuring the perceptions of a government’s ability to implement sound policies (World 
Bank). All of those variables range between -2.5 and 2.5 (Kraay, Kaufmann, & Mastruzzi, 
2010). Bribery and corruption (Brib_Cor), measuring the potential existence of bribery and 
corruption in each country (IMD WCD); Environmental performance index (EPI) measuring 
a country’s environmental performance (Yale Law School) and ranging between 0 and 100, 
Degree of journalistic freedom of a country (Jour_Free, Reporters without Borders) ranging 
between -100 and 0; Corruption Controls (Corr_Contr), measuring the perceptions about the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (World Bank) and ranging between 
-2.5 and 2.5 and law and order (Law & Order), measuring the strength of a country’s legal 
system (ICRG) ranging from 0 to 6. 
Our last institutional variable (factor_enf) captures a country’s governmental stability and 
public enforcement and is comprised of two variables: Gov_Stab, measuring a country’s 
governmental stability (ICRG) and the public enforcement index, PEI, measuring strength of 
a country’s public enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008). The former ranges from 0 to 12, and 
the latter ranges from 0 to 1.  
We expect our choice of country-level measures to expand the current literature in the context 
of CSR-disclosures. Specifically, we add a dimension for enforcement through the inclusion 
of the Anti Self Dealing Index, ASDI (Ernstberger et al., 2008) and the public enforcement 
index, PEI. In view of the mandatory inclusion of information about bribery and corruption 
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based on the CSR directive, the consideration of Brib_Cor and Corr_Cor also seems 
appropriate. Additionally, whereas only Cahan et al. (2016) account for ecology by 
considering the environmental performance index, EPI, we add another dimension that is 
more closely linked to the legal strength of a country, namely, the importance of 
environmental laws with Env_Laws. Finally, we expand the variables measuring the strength 
of the legal environment and follow Ernstberger et al. (2008) by adding Law_Order; 
additionally, we include Gov_Stab. 
We provide all the institutional variables for each country in Appendix IV. In the robustness 
section of the paper, we additionally examine institutional variables derived from the 
Hofstede database. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in equations (1) to 
(3). Our dataset comprises 3,961 observations for the first stage. For P we observe an average 
value of 42 EUR, BVE yields a mean of 22.11 EUR. The overall EPS range is from 0 to 43.46 
EUR, with a mean value of 2.41. The mean values of the textual variables vary between 0.01 
and 0.1, with environment, social and employee matters showing the scores with the highest 
level of similarity. In Figure 1 we provide some evidence about the yearly evolution of our 
topic-specific CSR disclosures; the pattern of a yearly increase in CSR disclosures is evident. 
Thus, one-year studies may only provide limited insight and transferability of results. 
We also provide descriptive statistics per country in Appendix V. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Table 4 provides the bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients. As expected and in line with 
the value-relevance model based on Ohlson (1995), we find high and significant correlations 
between the book value for equity and share price as well as between earnings per share and 
the share price. With respect to the disclosures measures, the results reveal negative and 
significant correlation coefficients between all the textual variables and share price. As 
expected, we obtain highly positive correlations between the textual measures, indicating that 
a disclosure on one of the topics is often accompanied by firm disclosures on the other topics 
in annual reports. This finding is similar to other studies that use a similar methodology 
(Hummel et al., 2017).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
5.2 Results on the Value Relevance of CSR Disclosures 
Table 5 reports the results for equations (1) and (2), where we regress prices on the book 
value of equity and earnings, both, per share as well as the respective topic-specific CSR 
disclosures measures Ti for the period before and after the announcement of the CSR 
directive.15 Our results show that all the textual variables convey new information to the 
market but that the effective direction depends on the observed period. For the period after the 
                                                          
15 The results remain basically unchanged when we run the regression for the sample of observations that are 
included in stage 2, i.e. n=3,303. 
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announcement of the CSR directive all topic-specific disclosures show a negative and 
significant relationship, whereas only TSOC, THR  and TCORR show a significant and positive 
relationship for the period before the publication of the directive. Therefore, we find support 
for our first hypothesis postulating that topic-specific CSR disclosures provide significant 
information content to capital market participants. 16  With respect to the size of the 
coefficients in the regression models the coefficients for TSOC, TEMPL and THR range between -
200 and -100, whereas they are higher for corruption and bribery amounting to -367 and -733 
respectively. BVE is approximately 0.95 and EARN 2.7; also the adjusted R2 of approximately 
95% is in line with the value relevance literature. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Furthermore, our results not only show that the effect of CSR disclosures depends on the 
considered topic but also on the regulatory setting, specifically the issuance of the CSR 
directive. The period before the communication of the CSR directive is obviously purely 
voluntary; however, as soon as the European Union communicates about the CSR directive in 
2014, companies anticipate the need for mandatory disclosures and prior results confirm the 
economic consequences of the issuance of the directive (Grewal et al., 2017). Thus, we 
consider the years 2014 and later as a semimandatory setting; before 2014, managers could 
choose which information to disclose. In such settings, managers provide information only if 
the marginal benefits of disclosures exceed the marginal costs (Verrecchia, 1983). However, 
one might also argue that, in a voluntary setting, managers can engage in opportunistic 
reporting to influence public perceptions and maintain the firms’ legitimacy. Although a 
                                                          
16 To control for the textual characteristics of the annual report we also include readability and tone in equations 
(1) and (2). The results (untabulated) remain unchanged. We also include financial characteristics such as size, 
leverage and profitability and our results remain stable. 
32 
 
direct comparison of our results is difficult, we are in line with prior value relevance studies 
observing a positive relationship between firm-value and CSR disclosures in a purely 
voluntary setting (Cahan et al., 2016; Clarkson et al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011, 2014; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Plumlee et al., 2015). For the period after the announcement of the CSR 
directive we find a negative relationship for all the variables, indicating that capital market 
participants may consider that information costly. Such a negative effect can be the result of 
costly CSR activities, as stated by Vance (1975) and Ullmann (1985) for example. One 
possible interpretation is that capital markets participants expect companies to either engage 
in costly CSR activities for the sake of the CSR directive or that the disclosures and 
preparation of the respective information is costly. This line of reasoning is in line also with 
Dorfleitner, Halbritter, & Nguyen (2015) who recently suggested that although overall ESG 
or KLD values may be positively related to financial performance, the real effect of CSR 
activities on financial performance depends on the importance of the theme behind the 
considered company and the relevant cost. 
5.3 Results on the Role of the Institutional Environment 
Based on our panel results that reveal significant results for all Ti, we investigate all six CSR 
topics. Table 6 provides descriptive results with respect to the incremental value relevance of 
the CSR topics based on the pooled regressions of equations (1) and (2).17 Column one shows 
descriptives (i.e. mean, standard deviation and median) for the adjusted R2 of the base model 
(i.e., equation 1), while the remaining columns report the adjusted R2 of the nested models, 
including the disclosures measures for the respective CSR topics. Over a sample of 374 firms 
the average R2 for the base model is 49.43% while the incremental R2 on average amounts to 
62%; thus, the inclusion of topic-specific CSR measures increases the mean adjusted R2 of the 
                                                          
17 When comparing the results of the panel, it has to be considered that since we require at least 8 observations 
per firm to be included in our pooled regressions, our sample is reduced to 3,303 firm-year observations, i.e. 374 
firms. 
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base model, indicating the incremental value relevance of adding topic-specific CSR 
disclosures.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Based on the 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) reported in Table 6 we analyze how the incremental value relevance is 
shaped by the institutional environment. Our approach of splitting CSR disclosures into 
different topics provides further insights into the debate: the results are shown in Table 7 and 
reveal a negative and significant relationship between factor_csr as well as factor_empl and 
the incremental value-relevance that is provided by the textual measures. For the relationship 
between factor_leg and factor_enf, our results show a positive and significant coefficient for 
some topic-specific CSR disclosures. Thus, we find support for hypotheses H2 a), b), c) and 
d).  
We find a negative relationship between factor_csr as well as factor_empl and CSR 
disclosures for all CSR topics. Therefore, if managers perceive that a country prioritizes CSR 
with respect to sustainable development through ethical practices in companies, socially 
responsible business leaders and decent environmental regulation, the incremental value 
relevance of topic-specific CSR disclosures is reduced. Thus, strong perceived compliance 
with CSR and employee protection on a country level reduces the incremental value relevance 
and thus the importance of supplementary information for capital market participants with 
respect to all the underlying topics. This finding also supports the reasoning of Matten and 
Moon (2008), specifically the implicit-explicit framework: if CSR awareness and employee 
protection are important on a country-level, companies do not need to address these topics 
explicitly, and thus, the incremental value relevance for capital market participants is limited. 
Companies cannot differentiate themselves from other companies through disclosures, and 
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thus, report implicitly. This result is especially relevant for standard setters with regard to 
enlarging the mandate for mandatory CSR reporting. 
We find a positive and significant relationship between factor_leg, measuring the strength of 
the legal environment for three topics, including human rights, corruption and bribery. Thus, 
for CSR information regarding environmental, social and employee matters, the strength of 
the legal system is not incrementally value relevant, whereas with regard to human rights, 
corruption and bribery, the strength of the legal environment increases the incremental value 
relevance. Thus, if the country-specific legal environment is stronger, the explanatory power 
of adding topic-specific CSR disclosures with respect to human rights, corruption and bribery 
increases. Bearing in mind the fact that the topics human rights, corruption and bribery exhibit 
the lowest similarity scores (see Figure 1), this result is interesting, providing evidence that 
for topics that are less common, on a national level, institutions play an important role in 
increasing their explanatory power. 
In line with legal strength, the factor accounting for the level of enforcement factor_enf , is 
also positive for all the topics, revealing a significant relationship for environment, social, 
employee matters, and human rights. Specifically the results indicate that the level of 
enforcement do not impact the incremental value relevance for the topics corruption and 
bribery. Thus, for more prevalent topics based on higher similarity scores, the level of 
enforcement is more important. Our findings on the factors factor_leg and factor_enf are 
generally in line with those of Wang and Yu (2015), but are contrary to those of Core et al. 
(2015), and Dhaliwal et al. (2012). However, note that these other studies often rely on 
composite measures for the institutional environment. 
With respect to the explanatory power of our models, for environment the R2 is the smallest 
only amounting to 5.7%; social and employee matters exhibit the highest explanatory power 
of more than 9%. 
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Taken together, our results show that especially the CSR awareness impacts the importance of 
topic-specific CSR disclosures. The higher the prioritization of CSR on a country-level, the 
lower the incremental value relevance resulting from the addition of topic-specific CSR 
disclosures. For legal strength and the level of enforcement we confirm the opposite 
relationship, showing that for certain disclosures, the value relevance increases with legal 
strength or the level of enforcement. Depending on the topic under consideration, it is either 
the legal strength or the level of enforcement which drives the incremental relevance; for 
those topics showing smaller similarity scores, the legal strength is significant, for those with 
higher scores it is the level of enforcement. Finally, only for the topic human rights all four 
factors are significant.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------- 
6. Further Analyses 
6.1 Alternative Model Specifications  
Due to measurement differences with respect to CSR disclosures proxies, clear comparisons 
with other studies are often difficult. However, in order to provide some robustness checks 
with respect to Dhaliwal et al. (2012), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2014), we also 
consider the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report as a proxy for CSR disclosures. Thus, we 
include an additional variable CSR_Report that takes on the value of 1 if the firm publishes a 
separate CSR report in the respective year and 0 otherwise.18 Our results are in line with 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011, 2014); Dhaliwal et al. (2012) showing a positive and significant 
                                                          
18 CSR_Report is measured based on hand-collected data; the reports were either gathered from the company 
websites or directly requested from the companies by email. Our results show that approximately 45% of the 
companies provide a CSR report. 
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relationship for the baseline model at a 10% significance level (untabulated). However, when 
considering both the respective topic-specific CSR disclosures and the issuance of a separate 
CSR report, our main results remain unchanged. Nevertheless, in this case CSR_Report is not 
significant. Thus, our results show that considering the mere publication of a CSR report is 
not enough to measure CSR disclosure. We need to account for the nature of the CSR 
disclosures and topic-specific measures are the main drivers of the results and thus, extend the 
view in important ways.  
Furthermore, the literature shows that CSR performance also has an impact on CSR 
disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hummel and Schlick, 2016). To account for the results 
confirming this relationship we include two measures of the sustainability performance of a 
firm. First, a dummy, DJSI, equal to 1 if the company is noted in the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI) and second, a4ir, the ESG score provided by Asset 4 Thomson 
Reuters, considers the overall ESG performance of the respective company. Concerning CSR 
performance, the overall asset 4 score denoted by a4ir for the considered sample is 78.88 on 
average over the whole considered time horizon and 24% of the sample companies are 
included in the DJSI (see Appendix VI). Both our CSR performance measures are positive 
and significant (untabulated) and our results for the topic-specific CSR disclosures remain 
largely unchanged, except that, for the former, environment and social matters are no longer 
significant for the pre-directive period, and for the latter, social matters and corruption do not 
longer show a significant relationship for the period before the directive. Thus, especially our 
negative coefficients for the post-directive period appear to be robust. 
We also conduct a number of additional analyses to investigate the robustness of our findings 
in the second stage. First, to rule out the impact of firm-specific factors on our findings, we 
rerun our regressions for equation (3), including additional control variables for firm-level 
characteristics, particularly firm size (logarithm of total revenues), firm profitability (return on 
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assets) and firm leverage (ratio of debt to total assets) and  firm CSR performance (DJSI and 
a4ir). Due to missing values on some of the control variables, our sample is reduced based on 
the availability of the underlying variables (see Table 3 for the number of observations per 
variable). The descriptives for the financial characteristics can be found in Appendix VI. The 
the average profitability is 8.8%, leverage is on average 13.91%.  
Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm-level characteristics. More interestingly, the 
results show that size as well as profitability have a negative and significant impact on the 
incremental value relevance for all the considered topics. The larger and more profitable the 
firm is, the less important CSR-disclosures are. This result is remarkable in the context of the 
CSR directive, since the directive mandates only that large companies publish this 
information. Leverage is positive and significant for social and employee matters as well as 
for corruption, indicating that for highly leveraged firms those topics increase the incremental 
value relevance of disclosures.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------- 
For the inclusion of CSR performance the results reveal that interestingly the impact depends 
on the underlying measure. DJSI is positive and significant for all topic-specific CSR 
disclosures, indicating that mere inclusion in the index increases the explanatory power of the 
topic-specific CSR disclosures in general. However, this result goes at the expense of the two 
factors accounting for the legal environment and employee protection for environmental 
matters, human rights, corruption and bribery. The inclusion of a4ir is not significant for any 
topic and does not impact the results. Taken together, the findings for CSR performance also 
show that the inclusion in the index increases the incremental value relevance of topic-
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specific CSR disclosures, and not a4ir. This is especially interesting for preparers of CSR 
information.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Finally, we rerun the pooled regression models (1) and (2) including CSR performance. Our 
results for the institutional factors remain largely unchanged. Only for employee matters and 
human rights does the relationship change significantly and for corruption and bribery 
factor_enf is positive and significant if a4ir is included (untabulated). 
6.2 Textual Analysis 
One could argue that our disclosure measures are biased due to other textual characteristics. 
Specifically, prior research shows that readability is positively associated with earnings (Li, 
2008), investment efficiency (Biddle et al., 2009), trading volume (Miller, 2010), lower 
analyst following (Lehavy et al., 2011) and lower earnings management (Lo, Ramos, & Rogo, 
2017). With respect to tone, there is empirical evidence that investors react more strongly to 
pessimistic analyst reports (A. Huang, Zang, & Rong, 2014). Allee and DeAngelis (2015) find 
that analysts and investors respond more negatively to firm disclosures when negative tone is 
more pervasive and more positively when positive tone is more pervasive. Readability refers 
to how easily the reader can grasp the content of a text while tone refers to the attitude of the 
text. The literature typically refers to the Fog Index, the Flesch-Kincaid and the Flesch 
Reading Ease as typical measures of readability. These measures are calculated based on the 
average number of words per sentence and the average number of syllables per word. 
Following De Franco, Hope, Vyas, & Zhou (2015) we create an aggregate measure of 
readability based on the Fog Index, the Flesch-Kincaid, and the Flesch Reading Ease. More 
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precisely, discl_readability is measured based on the average of the percentile ranks for each 
component, divided by 100 and multiplied by (-1) to enhance the intuitive interpretation of the 
measure.19 Thus, higher values in discl_readability reflect a better readability of the text. 
With respect to tone, we use the word list provided by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to 
identify positive and negative words in the annual reports. This word list has been specifically 
designed for accounting research. Our measure discl_tone is then calculated as the frequency 
of positive words (relative to all words) minus the frequency of negative words (relative to all 
words).   
With respect to the textual control variables discl_readability has a mean value of -0.5067 
indicating that all three underlying readability measures are consistent on average. The 
underlying Gunning Fog Index is 13 indicating that on average 13 years of education are 
needed to grasp the content of the annual reports at one. The tone of the annual reports is 
positive on average and amounts to 0.0023 on average. It is lower than for CSR reports 
(Hummel et al., 2017) and earnings press releases (X. Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2014), which 
makes sense because annual reports are legal documents. Compared to 8-K filings the tone is 
more positive (Henry and Leone, 2016). 
 
We include both measures and rerun the regressions for equations (1) to (3). Both measures 
are not significant in stage 1, i.e. equations (1) and (2) and our results remain unchanged 
(untabulated). This finding again strengthens our approach to using topic-specific measures; 
and argues in favour that these measures capture more than the general textual proxies do. 
With reference to the incremental value relevance our results are displayed in Table 10. Tone 
is negative and significant for all the topics indicating, that our CSR disclosures – when 
                                                          
19 To obtain consistent interpretations of discl_readability, we use the (101-percentile rank) for Flesch Reading 
Ease. 
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positive in tone – has a negative impact on the incremental value relevance. With respect to 
readability, only employee matters and human rights show a significant and positive 
relationship, indicating, that better readability increases the explanatory power of the 
inclusion of the CSR disclosures. Interestingly, this result is especially the case for people-
related variables.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Because our results with respect to the measurement of topic-specific CSR disclosure could 
also be biased because of boilerplate issues we perform two further analyses. First, we 
calculate similarity scores for standard boilerplate content (standard_boilerplate) and industry-
specific boilerplate content (industry_boilerplate) and include the two variables as additional 
controls in equation (1). Our results remain unchanged (untabulated). 
Second, in order to eliminate industry- and yearly boilerplate-effects we calculate an 
alternative measure for our topic-specific CSR disclosure by regressing our similarity score 
on the two boilerplate measures and use the resulting residuals as topic-specific disclosure. 
This allows us to consider a non-boilerplate measure, including only company-specific 
similarities to the respective topic. Our results (untabulated) remain robust only for the 
negative relationship between share price and TSOC, TEMPL, THR, TCORR and TBRIB. Thus, the 
negative coefficient could be an indication that especially context-specific information provided 
by companies exhibit a negative relationship with share price. Our results for stage 2 remain 
largely unchanged. 
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6.3 Institutional Variables 
To provide some comparability with existing studies we aggregate our four institutional 
factors to one factor and in line with Cahan et al. (2016) find a negative and significant impact 
of the institutional strength (see Table 11). However, through the consideration of four 
distinct factors, separately accounting for the CSR awareness, employee protection, the legal 
strength and the level of enforcement, we are able to disentangle the overall effect; as our 
results show this is necessary as different effects come into place and act in different 
directions. We also investigate a direct link between the institutional environment and CSR 
performance on the incremental value relevance of the CSR disclosures. Thus, we consider 
the aggregated measure of the institutional environment and interact it with DJSI. Our results 
(see Table 12) show, that the coefficient does not differ depending on the CSR performance 
and is negative and significant for both, fact_inst and fact_inst*DJSI. Separating our sample 
in above and below median based on the a4ir score does not show any significance at all. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 and 12 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Furthermore, following Hope (2003) we account for the national culture on a country-level 
and consider the dimensions provided by Hofstede (1983). We rerun our second stage 
analysis for every dimension separately. Regarding power of distance (POD), accounting for 
how a society handles inequalities among people, and individualism (IND), reflecting whether 
people’s self-image is defined by “I” or “we”, the results exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship for all topics, except environment. In contrast the relationship for all topics, 
except environment, is negative for the remaining dimensions including masculinity, 
measuring a society’s level of competitiveness, and the uncertainty avoidance index, 
expressing the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 
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and ambiguity. Interestingly, and in accordance with our previous results the topic 
environment is not shaped by cultural dimension provided by Hofstede. Our results are 
broadly in line with Cahan et al. (2016); and Hope (2003), except for POD, where one would 
expect a negative relationship. 
7. Conclusion 
This study investigates the value relevance of topic-specific CSR information in firms’ annual 
reports and how it is shaped by the national institutional environment. We use textual analysis 
to investigate firms’ disclosures in their annual reports on predefined CSR topics, namely, 
environment, employee matters, social matters, human rights, corruption and bribery. 
Specifically, we follow the methodology introduced by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) and 
Hummel et al. (2017) and extract twenty-word windows to construct a topic vocabulary for 
each CSR topic. We then measure the similarity between each annual report and the topic 
vocabularies. For a sample of 3,961 firm-year observations, we show that firms’ disclosures 
on the respective topics are indeed considered to provide informational content to capital 
markets. To analyze the incremental value relevance of the CSR topics, we consider the effect 
the institutional environment has on the increase in explanatory power, specifically the 
adjusted R2.  Based on the prior literature, we focus on four institutional factors: CSR 
awareness, employee protection, legal environment and enforcement. Our results indicate that 
CSR awareness and employee protection have a negative effect on explanatory power for the 
inclusion of environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, and 
corruption. This finding is consistent with the implicit-explicit framework (Matten and Moon, 
2008) framing that CSR disclosures are more implicit if there is more country-specific 
regulation with respect to the considered CSR topics. For the legal environment and 
enforcement, we find an indication of an increase in explanatory power.  However, in our 
robustness section, we provide evidence that both the financial and textual characteristics of 
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the annual report are also drivers of the information content incremental to adding topic-
specific CSR disclosures measures. 
As with all studies, this study is also subject to some limitations. While we are particularly 
interested in how the capital market perceives firms’ disclosures on CSR topics in annual 
reports, one may argue that firms provide CSR information through various disclosures 
channels, including separate CSR reports and company web sites. Although our additional 
analyses reveal that the issuance of a stand-alone CSR report is not value relevant, if topic-
specific CSR disclosures are added to the model, future research might examine the combined 
impact of both CSR disclosures in annual reports and stand-alone CSR reports. Such an 
analysis would also account for the growing trend towards integrated reporting. Second, this 
study is an association study and as such do not provide evidence for a causal relationship. 
Specifically, for the first stage of our study, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of 
reverse causality. Indeed, as revealed by Lys, Naughton, & Wang (2015), better performing 
firms might use CSR disclosure to signal their superior performance. Future studies might 
therefore choose a setting that allows for clear identification of the causal effects. Finally, the 
usual weaknesses of textual analysis apply. In particular, our sample consists of reports 
provided by firms located in different European countries in which English may be only the 
business language, not the native language and we therefore cannot completely rule out the 
fact that translation issues might impact the textual characteristics. However, as our focus of 
inquiry does not rely on purely textual characteristics such as readability and tone, but rather 
on topic-specific disclosures, we are confident that our results are not biased due to translation 
issues. Instead, this study applies a novel methodology in textual analysis to examine topic-
specific disclosures that might be of interest to other researchers, both in the area of CSR 
accounting and in other accounting areas.  
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APPENDIX I Variable Description 
Variable Description 
Source of 
data 
Main Variables    
P Share Price at fiscal year end Bloomberg 
BVE Book value of equity is common equity at fiscal year end, divided by the 
number of outstanding shares 
Datastream 
EARN Earnings per share at fiscal year end Datastream 
TENV tf-idf similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to environmental 
matters; the search term is “ecology” 
textual 
analysis 
TSOC tf-idf  similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to social matters; the 
search term is “social” 
textual 
analysis  
TEMPL tf-idf similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to employee matters, 
the search term is “employee” 
textual 
analysis 
THR tf-idf similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to respect to human 
rights; the search term is the bigram “human right” 
textual 
analysis 
TCORR tf-idf similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to corruption; the search 
term is “corruption” 
textual 
analysis 
TBRIB tf-idf similarity of the firm’s disclosures in the annual report with a 
vocabulary that reflects disclosures with respect to bribery; the search 
term is “bribery” 
textual 
analysis 
Institutional Variables  
factor_leg Institutional factor resulting from a PCA on the institutional variables as 
reported in Table 2. Results from the factor analysis are reported in table 
II in the appendix  
see table 2 
factor_csr Institutional factor resulting from a PCA on the institutional variables as 
reported in Table 2. Results from the factor analysis are reported in table 
II in the appendix 
see table 2 
factor_empl Institutional factor resulting from a PCA on the institutional variables as 
reported in Table 2. Results from the factor analysis are reported in table 
II in the appendix 
see table 2 
factor_gov Institutional factor resulting from a PCA on the institutional variables as 
reported in Table 2. Results from the factor analysis are reported in table 
II in the appendix 
see table 2 
Control Variables  
discl_tone (number of positive words – number of negative words)/number of total 
words of the voluntary CSR disclosures; word lists are defined 
according to the word list provided by Loughran and McDonald (2011); 
higher values reflect a more positive tone 
textual 
analysis 
discl_readability average mean of the percentile ranks for the Fog Index, and the Flesch-
Kincaid and the (101 – percentile ranks) for the Flesch-Reading-Ease, 
divided by 100, multiplied with (-1); higher values reflect higher 
readability 
textual 
analysis 
45 
 
leverage financial leverage of the firm measured as total debt divided by total 
assets at fiscal year end 
datastream 
size firm size measured as the logarithm of the revenues at fiscal year end  datastream 
profitability Profitability is measured as EBIT divided by total assets at fiscal year 
end 
datastream 
DJSI Dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was a constituent of the 
Dow Jones Sustainability index between 2010 and 2016  
DJSI 
a4ir ASSET4 score, details provided by ThomsonReuters (2015)  datastream 
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APPENDIX II Details on the construction of the topic-specific disclosures measures  
General procedure (analogous to Hummel et al. (2017) and Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015)) 
1. Let N denote the number of unique words in the entire corpus. 
2. For each topic, we query for pre-defined search term(s) across all documents (e.g. query 
for “bribery” for the topic-specific disclosures measure on bribery) 
3. For each query load, we retrieve twenty-word windows around the identified search 
terms. The twenty-word windows include the nine to ten words preceding the query 
term and the nine words following the query term. 
4. For each topic, we aggregate all retrieved twenty-word windows into a topic vocabulary. 
The topic vocabulary includes all words that appear in all retrieved twenty-word 
windows for each topic. 
5. For each topic, we define an N-vector search that is filled with the term-frequency-
inverse-document-frequency (tf-idf) of each word in the topic vocabulary corresponding 
to each of the N elements. 
6. For each firm i in each year t, we define an N-vector texti,t that is filled with the tf-idf 
for each word in firm i’s annual report in year t corresponding to each of the N 
elements.20 
7. For each element of the N-vector, the inverse-document-frequency (idf) is calculated as:  
(1) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙2 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 
 where  n: number of all documents 
   f: number of documents in which the word appears 
8. For each element of the N-vector search, the tf-idf is calculated as the product of the 
number of times the word appears in the topic vocabulary and the idf. 
9. For each element of the N-vector texti,t, the tf-idf is calculated as the product of the 
number of times the word appears in the annual report of firm i in year t (i.e. the term 
frequency) and the idf. 
10. To neutralize the impact of document length, we normalize the N-vector search as:  
(2) 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹ℎ_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ
√𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ∙𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ
 
11. Similarly, we normalize the N-vector texti,t: 
(3) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∙𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
12. To obtain the similarity between the firm i’s CSR disclosures in its annual report in year 
t and the topic vocabulary, we calculate similarityi,t as the cosine similarity (i.e., the dot 
product) between normi,t and search_norm. 
(4) 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹ℎ_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 
                                                          
20 Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) simply use a vector of word counts (i.e. the term frequency) instead of the tf-
idf. In contrast, the tf-idf incorporates a term weighting procedure (i.e., the inverse document frequency) and 
adjusts a word’s weight based on how (un)usual the word is. It thus reflects the importance of a word in a 
specific document relative to the importance of that word in the entire corpus. The more unusual the word, the 
higher the weight (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). 
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Simple example for the calculation of cosine similarity  
 
1. Consider three texts which – after applying the pre-processing methods – can be 
described according to the following word lists: 
text_1 =  [‘community’, ‘impact’, ‘involve’, ‘compliance’, ‘corruption’] 
text_2 =  [‘ethics, ‘community’, ‘involve, ‘impact’] 
text_3 =  [‘ethics’, ‘corruption’, ‘compliance’, ‘impact’, ‘bribery’] 
 
2. Consider the following training set (as a result of the search query): 
search =  [‘corruption’, ‘bribery’] 
 
3. The corpus is given as: 
corpus =  [‘corruption’, ‘bribery’, ‘ethics’, ‘compliance’, ‘involve’, ‘impact’, 
‘community’] 
 
4. The inverse-document-frequency for each word corresponds with: 
wcorruption  = 0.5850 
wbribery = 1.5850 
wethics  = 0.5850 
wcompliance  = 0.5850 
winvolve  = 0.5850 
wimpact  = 0.0000 
wcommunity  = 0.5850 
 
5. The tfidf-vector for the training set and each text corresponds with: 
search =  [0.5850, 1.5850, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
text_1 =  [0.5850, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850] 
text_2 =  [0.0, 0.0, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.5850] 
text_3 =  [0.5850, 1.5850, 0.5850, 0.5850, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
 
6. The normalized tfidf-vector for the training set and each text corresponds with: 
norm_search =  [0.3462, 0.9381, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
norm_text_1 =  [0.5, 0.0, 0.0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.0, 0.5] 
norm_text_2 =  [0.0, 0.0, 0.5774, 0.0, 0.5774, 0.0, 0.5774] 
norm_text_3 =  [0.311, 0.8426, 0.311, 0.311, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0] 
 
7. The cosine similarity for each text corresponds with: 
similarity_text_1 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_1 = 0.1731 
similarity_text_2 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_2 = 0.0000 
similarity_text_3 = norm_search ∙ norm_text_3 = 0.8981 
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APPENDIX III Overview of national-level institutional variables  
Variable Variable measurement Source 
Empl_Law Employment laws based on alternative employment contracts, cost 
of increasing hours worked, cost of firing workers and dismissal 
procedures  
Botero et al. (2004) 
SoSec_Law Social security laws Index based on old age, disability, and death 
benefits, sickness and health benefits and unemployment benefits  
Botero et al. (2004) 
Coll_Law Collective relations laws based on labour union power and collective 
disputes  
Botero et al. (2004) 
Human Rights 
Index (HRI) 
Human rights laws, considering human rights protection with higher 
scores indicating better human rights protection (HRI)  
Humana (1992) 
Rule_Law Extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of 
society 
World Bank 
Voice_Acct Extent to which a country’s citizen are able to select their 
government and voice other concerns 
World Bank 
Govt_Eff Perceptions of the quality of public services and polices, and the 
government to promote such policies 
World Bank 
Reg_Qual Perceptions of the government’s ability to formulate and implement 
sound policies 
World Bank 
Corr_Contr Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain 
World Bank 
Sust_Dev Sustainable development priority: “Sustainable development is a 
priority in countries.” 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
Database (WCD) 
Eth_Pract Ethical practice implementation: “Ethical practices are implemented 
in companies” 
IMD WCD 
Soc_Resp Social responsibility: “The social responsibility of business leaders 
is high” 
IMD WCD 
Brib_Cor Bribery and corruption: “Bribery and corruption do not exist” IMD WCD 
Env_Laws Environmental laws: “Environmental laws and compliance do not 
hinder the competitiveness of businesses” 
IMD WCD 
EPI Environmental Performance Index21 Yale Law School 
Jour_Free Degree of journalistic freedom  Reporters without 
borders 
Law & Order Strength and impartiality of the legal system and the popular 
observance of the law 
ICRG 
Gov_Stab Measure of the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs and to stay in office 
ICRG 
Anti Self-Dealing 
Index (ASDI) 
Ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing Djankov et al 
(2008) 
Public 
Enforcement Index 
(PEI) 
Strength of public enforcement of self-dealing Djankov et al 
(2008) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Multiplied by (-1) for consistency. Higher values thus reflect better environmental performance. 
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APPENDIX V Descriptives per Country 
 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB IE IT LU NL NO PT SE 
P 20.3865 53.6977 201.570
 
52.0220 74.3248 13.7301 19.7016 50.7746 11.3449 23.4918 8.9631 29.4834 29.8210 13.4309 8.6492 12.7885 
BVE 18.8698 39.1879 89.6147 39.3868 33.1958 7.5763 10.2575 30.0781 5.1563 7.9811 5.9755 12.9588 16.0371 7.8434 3.2042 9.2001 
EARN 1.6305 2.8325 11.2258 3.4894 3.1399 0.9163 1.2851 2.8055 0.7512 1.1120 0.5404 1.4963 1.6050 0.9722 0.3560 0.9219 
Post 0.3443 0.3824 0.3647 0.3783 0.3824 0.3431 0.3306 0.3428 0.3556 0.3380 0.3581 0.4000 0.3874 0.3421 0.3600 0.3553 
Score 0.0426 0.0490 0.0541 0.0599 0.0479 0.0607 0.0760 0.0820 0.0669 0.0627 0.0655 0.0462 0.0692 0.0646 0.0670 0.0678 
TENV 0.0642 0.0760 0.0871 0.0960 0.0743 0.0825 0.0960 0.1012 0.1078 0.0952 0.0955 0.0768 0.1050 0.0962 0.0918 0.0951 
TSOC 0.0430 0.0654 0.0701 0.0685 0.0629 0.0718 0.0754 0.0982 0.0832 0.0733 0.0740 0.0608 0.0849 0.0731 0.0698 0.0788 
TEMPL 0.0603 0.0764 0.0932 0.0901 0.0823 0.0696 0.0961 0.1016 0.1190 0.1024 0.0886 0.0772 0.1108 0.0988 0.0701 0.1049 
THR 0.0154 0.0235 0.0273 0.0282 0.0280 0.0370 0.0377 0.0379 0.0315 0.0252 0.0280 0.0222 0.0384 0.0350 0.0316 0.0365 
TCORR 0.0074 0.0114 0.0130 0.0149 0.0112 0.0168 0.0177 0.0183 0.0175 0.0131 0.0169 0.0116 0.0185 0.0210 0.0146 0.0196 
TBRIB 0.0048 0.0077 0.0090 0.0096 0.0076 0.0094 0.0112 0.0104 0.0154 0.0104 0.0106 0.0091 0.0129 0.0130 0.0081 0.0115 
Size 15.0547 15.1867 15.3090 16.4756 14.7054 15.6334 15.3421 16.0617 14.9532 15.1095 15.6171 15.2222 15.8196 15.7330 16.4080 14.7000 
Profitability 0.0448 0.0690 0.0964 0.0658 0.1144 0.0804 0.1014 0.0634 0.1061 0.0937 0.0574 0.1018 0.0753 0.0773 0.0700 0.0878 
Leverage 0.1369 0.2060 0.0249 0.1336 0.0839 0.2219 0.1031 0.1507 0.1288 0.0959 0.2821 0.1009 0.14967 0.1400 0.2316 0.1723 
Tone -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0036 0.0007 -0.0047 0.0028 0.0052 0.0050 0.0037 0.0022 -0.0096 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0032 -0.0017 0.0019 
Readability -0.3717 -0.4833 -0.4983 -0.6884 -0.2848 -0.4667 -0.4616 -0.4816 -0.5451 -0.4749 -0.5078 -0.4378 -0.6477 -0.5376 -0.3297 -0.3600 
A4IR 59.8380 67.0759 68.5628 75.9507 65.1073 85.3135 85.4924 82.4005 79.8573 58.2720 67.9009 52.9281 84.6431 81.8209 86.9336 74.1934 
DJSI - 0.0686 0.2305 0.3661 0.2059 0.4412 0.1638 0.2309 0.2486 0.0725 0.2466 - 0.3830 0.3108 0.3200 0.1063 
factor_csr 0.8791 0.2731 1.0379 0.6454 1.6850 -1.5144 1.2765 -0.4643 0.0795 0.4121 -1.5203 - 1.0471 1.1759 -1.5845 1.1882 
factor_empl 0.4823 -0.1088 0.2837 1.2596 0.3543 1.3889 0.2158 1.2945 -2.0264 -0.7710 0.9334 - 0.7217 1.2254 1.6069 1.2678 
factor_leg 0.8744 0.6086 1.0645 0.8675 1.2710 0.6283 1.2012 0.8016 0.6101 0.8951 0.0553 - 0.8611 1.2026 0.7008 1.3174 
factor_enf 0.2815 -0.1318 1.3825 0.9470 0.2996 0.2873 0.1703 -0.1074 -0.2734 -0.4452 -0.9012 - -0.4393 0.6825 0.4359 0.6118 
Observation
 
61 102 351 267 136 204 121 598 1,226 71 148 35 191 76 25 349 
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 factor_leg factor_csr factor_enf factor_empl 
Country SoSe
c_La
w 
HRI Rule
_Law 
Voic
e_Ac
ct 
Gov_
Eff 
Reg_
Qual 
 
Brib_
Corr 
EPI Jour_
Free 
Corr-
Contr 
Law
&Or
der 
Sust_
Dev 
Eth_
Pract 
Soc_
Resp 
Env_
Laws 
Gov_
Stab 
PEI Emp
_Law 
Coll_
Law 
ASD 
AT 0.7 95.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.5 6.2 84.8 3.8 1.6 6.0 7.3 7.4 6.8 6.3 7.2 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.2 
BE 0.6 96.0 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 6.3 78.9 6.4 1.6 5.0 6.4 7.2 6.0 5.9 7.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
CH 0.9 98.0 1.9 1.6 2.0 1.8 9.1 88.4 2.9 2.3 6.0 7.9 8.2 7.6 7.4 7.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 
GER 0.8 99.0 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.8 8.6 90.6 1.2 2.2 6.0 7.3 8.1 6.6 7.5 7.3 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.5 
DK 0.8 94.0 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.2 6.2 86.7 15.5 1.4 5.0 5.8 6.8 5.4 6.4 6.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.4 
ES 0.7 98.0 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.6 7.2 83.5 5.9 1.8 5.0 7.3 7.7 6.2 6.5 8.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.3 
FI 0.7 94.0 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 7.1 87.6 11.5 1.6 6.0 6.2 7.4 6.1 7.0 6.7 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.8 
FR 0.8 90.0 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.8 2.2 83.4 20.9 0.1 4.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 5.5 6.9 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 
GB 0.6 98.0 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.8 7.8 80.9 4.5 2.1 6.0 6.9 7.8 6.4 6.4 7.0 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.2 
IE 0.8 97.0 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.6 7.1 87.3 4.3 2.2 6.0 7.3 8.0 7.2 7.7 7.4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 
IT 0.7 92.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.8 3.8 87.8 11.1 1.0 5.0 5.3 5.2 4.3 6.4 6.9 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 
NL 0.8 87.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 3.7 87.6 14.6 0.9 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.6 5.8 6.8 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 
NO 0.8 98.0 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.8 7.9 89.2 3.6 2.2 6.0 7.5 8.1 7.0 7.7 6.9 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.3 
PT 0.8 96.0 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.7 8.1 86.3 4.2 2.1 5.0 7.1 8.0 6.5 7.7 8.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 
SE 0.7 93.0 1.7 1.3 1.6 1.7 6.9 70.9 10.9 1.7 5.2 5.5 7.3 5.6 6.1 7.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.0 
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the variables entering further analyses 
  Mean Std. Dev Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum Observations 
Size 15.4163 1.5776 7.0884 14.3123 15.4356 16.5642 19.4884 3,285 
Profitability 0.0875 0.1482 -0.8007 0.0344 0.0712 0.1151 3.1610 3,285 
Leverage 0.1391 0.2148 -0.9299 0.0088 0.1474 0.2769 1.1009 3,285 
discl_tone 0.0023 0.0104 -0.0232 -0.0039 0.0014 0.0070 0.0694 3,303 
discl_readability -0.5067 0.2734 -1.0000 -0.7333 -0.5033 -0.2867 -0.0100 3,303 
a4ir 78.8797 21.8444 3.1400 75.5600 88.0800 92.8300 97.4500 3,165 
DJSI 0.2484 0.4322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 3,297 
factor_csr 0.2343 0.8296 -1.5845 0.0795 0.0795 1.0379 1.6850 3,303 
factor_empl -0.0779 1.4362 -2.0264 -2.0264 0.3543 1.2678 1.6069 3,303 
factor_leg 0.8099 0.2845 0.0553 0.6101 0.8016 1.0645 1.3174 3,303 
factor_enf 0.1019 0.5686 -0.9012 -0.2734 -0.1074 0.4359 1.3825 3,303 
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Tables 
Table 1 Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A: Sample selection  
 total 
Initial population of firm-year observations for 600 firms (2008-2016) 5,400 
Less: observations for which the annual report is not available -377 
= firm-year observations with available annual reports 5,023  
Less: observations that cannot be processed in textual analysis  -850 
= firm-year observations with processable annual reports 4,173 
Less: observations with missing main variables -212 
Total sample 3,961 
Panel B: Sample distribution by industry group  
 Freq. 
1 Consumer Non-durables 291 
2 Consumer Durables 130 
3 Manufacturing 515 
4 Energy 92 
5 Chemicals 209 
6 Business equipment 260 
7 Communication 227 
8 Utilities 164 
9 Wholesale 306 
10 Healthcare 265 
11 Finance 824 
12 Other 678 
Total sample 3,961 
Panel C: Sample distribution by countries  
 Freq. 
1 Austria 61 
2 Belgium 102 
3 Switzerland 351 
4 Germany 267 
5 Denmark 136 
6 Spain 204 
7 Finland 121 
8 France 598 
9 United Kingdom 1,226 
10 Ireland 71 
11 Italy 148 
12 Luxembourg 35 
13 Netherlands 191 
14 Norway 76 
15 Portugal 25 
16 Sweden 349 
Total sample 3,961 
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Table 2 Overview of Textual Variables 
Panel A: Top-20 Words   
 Total number 
of words 
Number of 
unique words Ti Top 20 words 
TENV ‘ecology’ (989), ‘development’ (418), ‘sustainable’ (406), ‘energy’ 
(363), ‘ministry’ (299), ‘management’ (176), ‘environmental’ (164), 
‘director’ (123), ‘sustainability’ (122), ‘biodiversity’ (120), ‘project’ 
(113), ‘company’ (105), ‘report’ (101), ‘use’ (99), ‘economy’ (98), 
‘environment’ (91), ‘climate’ (86), ‘material’ (80), ‘transport’ (76), 
‘building’ (75) 
18,280 3,343 
TSOC ‘social’ (162,132), ‘responsibility’ (38,693), ‘environmental’ 
(38,634), ‘corporate’ (31,345), ‘report’ (24,775), ‘security’ (24,360), 
‘employee’ (23,410), ‘company’ (20,735), ‘information’ (20,324), 
‘cost’ (16,074), ‘economic’ (15,513), ‘business’ (15,256), ‘financial’ 
(14,435), ‘management’ (14,410), ‘development’ (13,309), 
‘contribution’ (12,035), ‘benefit’ (11,749), ‘policy’ (11,741), ‘risk’ 
(11,651), ‘tax’ (10,969) 
2,565,511 42,115 
TEMP ‘employee’ (865,083), ‘share’ (224,953), ‘benefit’ (136,486), ‘plan’ 
(133,910), ‘company’ (128,974), ‘number’ (88,554), ‘director’ 
(59,063), ‘management’ (57,249), ‘option’ (57,222), ‘board’ 
(52,515), ‘financial’ (52,502), ‘business’ (52,492), ‘pension’ 
(51,067), ‘service’ (48,306), ‘cost’ (47,934), ‘report’ (47,747), 
‘scheme’ (46,254), ‘executive’ (45,483), ‘performance’ (45,046), 
‘based’ (43,771) 
11,125,751 
 
76,627 
 
THR ‘right’ (25,784), ‘human’ (24,758), ‘principle’ (4,891), ‘business’ 
(4,817), ‘policy’ (3,430), ‘respect’ (3,302), ‘supplier’ (3,064), 
‘employee’ (2,843), ‘risk’ (2,439), ‘global’ (2,420), ‘labour’ (2,398), 
‘company' (2,296), ‘environment’ (2,072), ‘standard’ (2,025), 
‘corruption’ (2,016), ‘compact’ (1,964), ‘declaration’ (1,880), ‘code’ 
(1,877), ‘social’ (1,875), ‘conduct’ (1,778) 
338,393 8,621 
TCORR ‘corruption’ (18,136), ‘anti’ (8,467), ‘risk’ (4,339), ‘bribery’ (4,275), 
‘policy’ (3,818), ‘business’ (3,768), ‘compliance’ (3,466), 
‘employee’ (2,708), ‘right’ (2,481), ‘code’ (2,252), ‘human’ (2,209), 
‘conduct’ (2,069), ‘training’ (2,039), ‘company’ (2,024), ‘law’ 
(1,937), ‘ethic’ (1,794), ‘principle’ (1,726), ‘practice’ (1,506), 
‘procedure’ (1,490), ‘management’ (1,430) 
278,992 8,134 
TBRIB ‘bribery’ (7,334), ‘corruption’ (4,296), ‘anti’ (3,868), ‘policy’ 
(2,259), ‘act’ (1,736), ‘business’ (1,735), ‘risk’ (1,695), ‘compliance’ 
(1,549), ‘employee’ (1,317), ‘code’ (1,053), ‘conduct’ (996), ‘law’ 
(995), ‘training’ (986), ‘including’ (949), ‘company’ (807), 
‘procedure’ (788), ‘report’ (689), ‘fraud’ (672), ‘control’ (643), 
‘management’ (632) 
118,180 4,996 
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Panel B: Word Window Examples 
 Twenty-word window Corresponding CSR disclosure 
TENV TENV: 'system', 'energy', 
'optimization', 'thermal', 'insulation', 
'infrastructure', 'relevant', 'value', 
'relation', 'operational', 'ecology', 
'collected', 'consolidated', 
'consolidated', 'value', 'assessed', 
'used', 'benchmark', 'verify', 'realized' 
Roche, Annual Report 2012, p 112: 
“[…] measures to reduce energy consumption are 
implemented, whether through production installations 
equipped with intelligent energy management systems or 
through the energy optimization and thermal insulation of 
infrastructures. All the relevant values in relation to operational 
ecology are collected and consolidated annually. These 
consolidated values are assessed and used as a benchmark to 
verify realized objectives” 
TSOC TSOC: ‘corporate', 'social', 
'responsibility', 'includes', 'support', 
'social', 'institution', 'local', 'basis', 
'demonstrate', 'social', 
'responsibility', 'making', 'donation', 
'various', 'organization', 'provide', 
'direct', 'efficient', 'unbureaucratic' 
Wienerberger, Annual Report 2011, p 51:  
“This central principle of active corporate social responsibility 
includes support for social institutions on a local basis. We do 
not demonstrate our social responsibility by making donations 
to various international organizations, but provide direct, 
efficient and unbureaucratic help”  
TEMP TEMPL: 'called', 'coaching', 
'performance', 'initiated', 'manager', 
'goal', 'strengthening', 'feedback', 
'culture', 'improving', 'employee', 
'performance', 'crucial', 'make', 
'high', 'performing', 'learning', 
'organization', 'recognized', 'best' 
Electrolux, Annual Report 2013, p 45: 
“[…] a global training program called (Coaching for 
Performance) was initiated in 2013 for all managers with the 
goal of strengthening the feedback culture and improving 
employee performance. This is crucial to make Electrolux a 
high-performing learning organization. To be recognized as 
the best appliance company by our employees is an important 
vision for Electrolux” 
THR THR: 'business', 'human', 'right', 
'ungp', 'base', 'human', 'right', 
'commitment', 'policy', 'bill', 'human', 
'right', 'universal', 'declaration', 
'human', 'right', 'covenant', 'civil', 
'political', 'right' 
Unilever, Annual Report 2013, p 17: 
“In line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGP), we base our human rights 
commitment and policy on the International Bill of Human 
Rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights)” 
TCORR TCORR: 'act', 'lawful', 'manner', 
'particular', 'emphasis', 'placed', 
'compliance', 'antitrust', 'legislation', 
'avoidance', 'corruption', 'risk', 
'compliance', 'measure', 
'supplemented', 'range', 'internal', 
'policy', 'guideline', 'instruction' 
BMW Group, Annual Report 2014, p 185: 
A coordinated set of instruments and measures is employed to 
ensure that the BMW Group, its representative bodies, its 
managers and staff act in a lawful manner. Particular emphasis 
is placed on compliance with antitrust legislation and the 
avoidance of corruption risks. Compliance measures are 
supplemented by a whole range of internal policies, guidelines 
and instructions”  
TBRIB TBRIB: 'regulation', 'relating', 
'import', 'export', 'control', 'money', 
'laundering', 'false', 'accounting', 
'anti', 'bribery', 'anti', 'boycott', 
'provision', 'non', 'compliance', 
'expose', 'fine', 'penalty', 'suspension' 
BAE Systems, Annual Report 2013, p 108:  
These include, without limitation, regulations relating to import 
export controls, money laundering, false accounting, anti-
bribery and anti-boycott provisions. Non-compliance could 
expose the Group to fines, penalties, suspension or debarment, 
which could have a material adverse effect on the Group. 
Panel A of the table presents the top-20 word windows for each topic-specific vocabulary. The frequency of the 
respective word appears in the vocabulary and is indicated in parentheses. Panel B shows examples retrieved from 
our sample annual reports for every Ti.  
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for all variables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of all variables 
  Mean Std. Dev Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum Observations 
P 41.9968 99.7624 0.7497 6.5767 16.0843 37.2521 797.7345              3,961  
BVE 22.1115 44.6695 -0.0841 3.3875 8.2736 20.3687 311.8097              3,961  
EARN 2.4112 5.5593 0.0000 0.3300 0.9200 2.1800 43.4600              3,961  
Post 0.3575 0.4793 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000              3,961  
TENV 0.0940 0.0393 0.0005 0.0688 0.0940 0.1228 0.2509              3,961  
TSOC 0.0794 0.0339 0.0004 0.0559 0.0753 0.0990 0.2875              3,961  
TEMPL 0.1015 0.0432 0.0002 0.0683 0.0970 0.1330 0.2485              3,961  
THR 0.0323 0.0191 0.0003 0.0205 0.0294 0.0398 0.2504              3,961  
TCORR 0.0166 0.0103 0.0001 0.0098 0.0145 0.0209 0.1084              3,961  
TBRIB 0.0117 0.0070 0.0000 0.0066 0.0104 0.0150 0.0614              3,961  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the first stage regressions (i.e. equations (1) and (2)) 
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix 
 P BVE EARN Post TENV TSOC TEMPL THR TCORR TBRIB 
P 1.0000          
           
BVE 0.8314 1.0000         
 (0.0000)          
EARN 0.9037 0.8342 1.0000        
 (0.0000) (0.0000)         
Post 0.0735 0.0270 0.0321 1.0000       
 (0.0000) (0.0887) (0.0431)        
TENV -0.0846 -0.0708 -0.0571 0.0762 1.0000      
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)       
TSOC -0.0700 -0.0568 -0.0483 0.1127 0.8904 1.0000     
 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
TEMPL -0.1070 -0.1125 -0.0798 0.0454 0.8868 0.8821 1.0000    
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
THR -0.0485 -0.0657 -0.0427 0.1889 0.7276 0.8147 0.6564 1.0000   
 (0.0023) (0.0000) (0.0072) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
TCORR -0.0860 -0.1009 -0.0751 0.2036 0.7602 0.7981 0.6898 0.9233 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
TBRIB -0.1222 -0.1561 -0.1063 0.1612 0.7898 0.7280 0.7629 0.6847 0.8549 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
This table presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) for a two-tailed test of statistical significance.  
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Figure 1 Topic-Specific CSR Disclosure by Year  
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Table 5 Results for Equation (1) and (2) – Nested Price Panel Regressions Price is regressed on book value of equity and earnings, both per share  
and on the respective CSR disclosure measures Ti 
Equation (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
BV 0.9662 *** 0.9559 *** 0.9602 *** 0.9563 *** 0.9638 0.9576 *** 0.9483 *** 
 (3.5071) (3.5084) (3.5078) (3.5074) (3.5114) (3.5049) (3.4985) 
EARN 2.7013 *** 2.6779 *** 2.6887 *** 2.6838 *** 2.6895 2.6863 *** 2.6706 *** 
 (3.0271)  (3.0487) (3.0505) (3.0535) (3.0381) (3.0490) (3.0684) 
TENV   17.0286      
   (0.7302)      
Post*TENV   -119.7881 ***      
   (-3.0810)      
TSOC    47.3939 *     
    (1.8149)     
Post*TSOC    -104.5475 ***     
    (-2.7880)     
TEMPL     27.1312    
     (1.3825)    
Post*TEMPL     -105.1878 ***    
     (-3.4179)    
THR      129.5665 **   
      (2.1932)     
Post*THR      -169.4093 ***   
      (-2.6723)     
TCORR       187.2301 *  
       (1.9189)  
Post*TCORR       -367.6679 ***  
       (-3.1384)  
TBRIB        78.3899 
        (0.7799) 
Post*TBRIB        -733.3985 *** 
        (-4.4339) 
Constant 1.0608  -0.2413 -2.1731 -1.3256 -2.3523 -1.1750 0.6983 
 
(0.2154)  (-0.0433) (-0.3920) (-0.2443) (-0.4299) (-0.2260) (0.1407) 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Firm fixed effects YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.9603  0.9548  0.9606  0.9607  0.9605  0.9606  0.9610  
F 18.46  16.97  17.11  16.70  17.62  16.67  17.41  
Observations 3,961  3,961  3,961  3,961  3,961  3,961  3,961  
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. This table reports the results for the effect of topic-specific CSR disclosure on prices analysed via panel 
with fixed effects for years and cross-section. A description of the variables under consideration can be found in table I in the appendix. 
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Table 6 Descriptives of R2 of pooled Equations (1) and (2) on firm level 
  
 
𝐸𝐸2 (𝐵𝐵) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
Mean  0.4934 0.6147 0.6218 0.6182 0.6259 0.6251 0.6264 
Std. Dev.  0.3773 0.3616 0.35929 0.3524 0.3502 0.3556 0.3504 
Median  0.5820 0.7403 0.74398 0.7343 0.7411 0.7377 0.7456 
Observations  3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 
This table presents the results for the incremental changes; in the first column the adjusted R2 for the pooled estimation of equation (1) is presented, whereas the remaining 
columns show the adjusted R2 from the effect of the respective textual disclosure on prices analysed via pooled regressions of equation (2).  
 
Table 7 Results for Equation (3) – Incremental Value Relevance of Institutional Environment Herein we regress R2 inc(Ti) on the institutional  
factors, controlling for industry and country-fixed effects  
 
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance 
attributable to the addition of the topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_csr, factor_empl, factor_leg and factor_enf are four factors measuring the 
strength of the institutional environment with respect to CSR, employee, leg and enforcement issues. The factors are generated through a PCA with 
Oblimin rotations. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. 
  
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_csr -0.1608 *** -0.2406 *** -0.2266 *** -0.2164 *** -0.1693 *** -0.2322 *** 
 (-4.1494) (-6.2234) (-6.1269) (-5.4616) (-4.2202) (-5.8580) 
factor_empl -0.2443 *** -0.3158 *** -0.3255 ** -0.1649 ** -0.1322 * -0.1580 ** 
 (-3.7194) (-4.8196) (-5.1931) (-2.4557) (-1.9439) (-2.3516) 
factor_leg 0.1095 0.2329 0.0427 0.5100 *** 0.7075 *** 0.6979 *** 
 (0.6423) (1.3688) (0.2626) (2.9257) (4.0089) (4.0009) 
factor_enf 1.1803 *** 1.4657 *** 1.6101 *** 0.6395 ** 0.3067 0.4533 
 (3.7776) (4.7022) (5.4000) (2.0022) (0.9483) (1.4182) 
Constant -0.1443 -0.2672 ** -0.1554 -0.3403 *** -0.5110 *** -0.5206 *** 
 (-1.1682) (-2.1677) (-1.3181) (-2.6947) (-3.9961) (-4.1193) 
       
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 
R-squared 0.05753 0.0924 0.0979 0.0712 0.0640 0.0746 
F 10.68 13.34 14.22 10.05 8.964 10.57 
71 
 
 
Table 8 Results for Equation (3) controlling for Financial Characteristics of the Firms We regress 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) on the institutional factors and add financial 
characteristics including size, leverage and profitability, controlling for industry- and country-fixed effects. 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_csr -0.1668 *** -0.2467 *** -0.2343 *** -0.2229 *** -0.1759 *** -0.2388 *** 
 (-4.3071) (-6.3923) (-6.3624) (-5.6343) (-4.3926) (-6.0501) 
factor_empl -0.2584 *** -0.3357 *** -0.3454 *** -0.1804 *** -0.1488 ** -0.1804 *** 
 (-3.9309) (-5.1264) (-5.5268) (-2.6858) (-2.1903) (-2.6928) 
factor_leg 0.0924 0.2031 0.0186 0.4928 *** 0.6885 *** 0.6699 *** 
 (0.5412) (1.1941) (0.1145) (2.8254) (3.9006) (3.8500) 
factor_enf 1.2473 *** 1.5624 *** 1.7045 *** 0.7115 ** 0.3840 0.5574 * 
 (3.9865) (5.0122) (5.7300) (2.2262) (1.1871) (1.7481) 
size -0.0145 *** -0.0151 *** -0.0173 *** -0.0148 *** -0.0147 *** -0.0149 *** 
 (-4.2123) (-4.4269) (-5.3182) (-4.2300) (-4.1438) (-4.2711) 
leverage 0.0267 0.0640 *** 0.0520 ** 0.0336 0.0440 * 0.0891 *** 
 (1.0901) (2.6222) (2.2336) (1.3439) (1.7382) (3.5694) 
profitability -0.1061 *** -0.1008 *** -0.1183 *** -0.1177 *** -0.1249 *** -0.1254 *** 
 (-3.1691) (-3.0213) (-3.7148) (-3.4402) (-3.6085) (-3.6738) 
Constant 0.0850 -0.0329 0.1141 -0.1066 -0.2806 ** -0.2961 *** 
 (0.6266) (-0.2435) (0.8848) (-0.7696) (-2.0012) (-2.1417) 
       
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
cObservations 3,285 3,285 3,285 3,285 3,285 3,285 
R-squared 0.0828 0.1021 0.1107 0.0794 0.0729 0.0876 
F 10.49 13.22 14.47 10.04 9.142 11.16 
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance attributable to the addition of the 
topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_csr, factor_empl, factor_leg and factor_enf are four factors measuring the strength of the institutional environment with respect to CSR, 
employee, leg and enforcement issues. The factors are generated through a PCA with Oblimin rotations. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. All other 
variables are shown in table I in the appendix and winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 9 Results for Equation (3) controlling CSR performance We regress 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) on the institutional factors and CSR performance measured either by 
A4IR or DJSI, controlling for industry- and country-fixed effects. 
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_csr -0.1762 *** -0.1521 *** -0.2580 *** -0.2317 *** -0.2480 *** -0.2197 *** -0.2320 *** -0.2086 *** -0.1904 *** -0.1612 *** -0.2542 *** -0.2231 *** 
 (-4.3573)  (-3.9338)  (-6.3892)  (-6.0035)  (-6.4358)  (-5.9424)  (-5.6001)  (-5.2734)  (-4.5450)  (-4.0248)  (-6.1448)  (-5.6422)  
factor_empl -0.2957 *** -0.2228 *** -0.3640 *** -0.2930 *** -0.3795 *** -0.3081 *** -0.2122 *** -0.1457 ** -0.1889 *** -0.1123 * -0.2190 *** -0.1356 ** 
 (-4.3868)  (-3.3908)  (-5.4072)  (-4.4683)  (-5.9077)  (-4.9039)  (-3.0716)  (-2.1677)  (-2.7049)  (-1.6502)  (-3.1751)  (-2.0177)  
factor_leg 0.0293  0.1262  0.1806  0.2511  -0.0010  0.0567  0.444 ** 0.5247 *** 0.6520 *** 0.7227 *** 0.6351 *** 0.7152 *** 
 (0.1671)  (0.7422)  (1.0326)  (1.4804)  (-0.0061)  (0.3487)  (2.4736)  (3.0167)  (3.5927)  (4.1044)  (3.5434)  (4.1131)  
factor_enf 1.4145 *** 1.0837 *** 1.6739 *** 1.3630 *** 1.8385 *** 1.5317 *** 0.8500 *** 0.5535 * 0.5503 * 0.2176  0.7168 ** 0.3527  
 (4.4774)  (3.4683)  (5.3053)  (4.3712)  (6.1061)  (5.1268)  (2.6254)  (1.7315)  (1.6811)  (0.6726)  (2.2171)  (1.1035)  
a4ir 0.0000    0.0003    0.0001    0.0002    0.0004    0.0003    
 (0.1168)    (1.1810)    (0.2983)    (0.9517)    (1.4197)    (1.3942)    
djsi   0.0409 ***   0.0436 ***   0.0335 ***   0.0361 ***   0.0376 ***   0.0427 *** 
   (3.6354)    (3.8767)    (3.1113)    (3.1345)    (3.2203)    (3.7047)  
Constant -0.1273  -0.1498  -0.2891 ** -0.2733 ** -0.1721  -0.1602  -0.3459 *** -0.3449 *** -0.5456 *** -0.5158 *** -0.5529 *** -0.5263 *** 
 (-0.9813)  (-1.2166)  (-2.2318)  (-2.2241)  (-1.3921) (-1.3609) (-2.6027) (-2.7381) (-4.0598) (-4.0449) (-4.1658) (-4.1791) 
             
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,165  3,297  3,165  3,297  3,165  3,297  3,165  3,297  3,165  3,297  3,165  3,297  
R-squared 0.0808  0.0796  0.0957  0.0969  0.1044  0.1006  0.0724  0.0741  0.0652  0.0671  0.0776  0.0788  
F 10.61  10.88  12.77  13.50  14.07  14.07  9.421  10.07  8.418  9.040  10.15  10.75  
 
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance 
attributable to the addition of the topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_csr, factor_empl, factor_leg and factor_enf are four factors measuring the 
strength of the institutional environment with respect to CSR, employee, leg and enforcement issues. The factors are generated through a PCA with 
Oblimin rotations. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. All other variables are shown in table I in the appendix and winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 10 Results for Equation (3) controlling for Textual Characteristics We regress 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) on the Institutional Environment and Textual Characteristics of 
the Annual Report, namely readability and tone, controlling for industry- and country-fixed effects. 
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_csr -0.1615 *** -0.2413 *** -0.2271 *** -0.2171 *** -0.1700 *** -0.2329 *** 
 (-4.1775) (-6.2634) (-6.1548) (-5.4956) (-4.2525) (-5.8916) 
factor_empl -0.2442 *** -0.3148 *** -0.3335 *** -0.1671 ** -0.1310 * -0.1566 ** 
 (-3.6985) (-4.7817) (-5.2887) (-2.4766) (-1.9174) (-2.3189) 
factor_leg 0.1375 0.2656 0.0525 0.5360 *** 0.7411 *** 0.7293 *** 
 (0.8053) (1.5600) (0.3220) (3.0712) (4.1952) (4.1748) 
factor_enf 1.1474 *** 1.4247 *** 1.6200 *** 0.6152 * 0.2643 0.4129 
 (3.6526) (4.5495) (5.4012) (1.9162) (0.8135) (1.2852) 
discl_tone -2.0290 *** -2.2841 *** -1.4547 *** -2.1027 *** -2.3322 *** -2.1535 *** 
 (-3.8329) (-4.3281) (-2.8780) (-3.8867) (-4.2590) (-3.9773) 
discl_readability 0.0297 0.0309 0.0426 ** 0.0370 * 0.0312 0.0281 
 (1.5244) (1.5921) (2.2897) (1.8569) (1.5502) (1.4087) 
Constant -0.1404 -0.2640 ** -0.1418 -0.3331 *** -0.5079 *** -0.5182 *** 
 (-1.1351) (-2.1413) (-1.2010) (-2.6355) (-3.9702) (-4.0960) 
       
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 
R-squared 0.0808 0.0990 0.1023 0.0773 0.0706 0.0803 
F 10.66 13.33 13.82 10.16 9.218 10.59 
 
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance attributable to the addition of the 
topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_csr, factor_empl, factor_leg and factor_enf are four factors measuring the strength of the institutional environment with respect to CSR, 
employee, leg and enforcement issues. The factors are generated through a PCA with Oblimin rotations. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. All other 
variables are shown in table I in the appendix and winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
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Table 11 Results for Equation (3) – Incremental Value Relevance of Institutional Environment based on aggregated four factors We regress 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) 
on the factor_inst, controlling for industry and country-fixed effects  
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance attributable to the addition of the 
topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_inst is our composite measure of the strength of the institutional environment that is equal to the mean of the four factors generated 
through a PCA. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. 
 
  
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_inst -0.0559 -0.1065 *** -0.0903 ** -0.0941 ** -0.1064 *** -0.1417 *** 
 (-1.4849) (-2.8373) (-2.5139) (-2.4456) (-2.7308) (-3.6796) 
Constant 0.0596 *** 0.0521 ** 0.0357 0.0751 *** 0.0484 ** 0.0260 
 (2.5143) (2.2048) (1.5796) (3.0975) (1.9716) (1.0714) 
       
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 3,303 
R-squared 0.0753 0.0924 0.0979 0.0712 0.0640 0.0746 
F 10.68 13.34 14.22 10.05 8.964 10.57 
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Table 12 Results for Equation (3) – Incremental Value Relevance of the Institutional Environment differentiating between good and bad CSR 
performers   
We regress 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) on the factor_inst and an interaction between factor_inst and good CSR performers measured either by an inclusion in the DJSI or an above median 
A4IR performance, controlling for industry and country-fixed effects  
 
This table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) based on the standard variance estimator. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. The dependent variable is Rincr(Ti), the incremental value relevance attributable to the addition of the 
topic-specific CSR disclosure. factor_inst is our composite measure of the strength of the institutional environment that is equal to the mean of the four factors generated 
through a PCA. A4IR_good is 1 if the company has an above median score and zero otherwise. See table 2 for a description of the institutional variables. 
 
 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 (𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) 
factor_inst -0.0368  -0.0542  -0.0837 ** -0.1065 *** -0.0723 ** -0.0861 ** -0.0744 * -0.0855 ** -0.0895 ** -0.1038 *** -0.1235 *** -0.1395 *** 
 (-0.9763)  (-1.4152)  (-2.2305)  (-2.7868)  (-2.0088)  (-2.3550)  (-1.9331)  (-2.1844)  (-2.2941)  (-2.6161)  (-3.2067)  (-3.5595)  
DJSI = 1 0.0549 ***   0.0634 ***   0.0496 ***   0.0533 ***   0.0490 ***   0.0540 ***   
 (4.5292)    (5.2425)    (4.2808)    (4.2966)    (3.8956)    (4.3477)    
DJSI*factor_inst -0.0611 ***   -0.0863 ***   -0.0703 ***   -0.0749 ***   -0.0498 **   -0.0493 **   
 (-3.0805)    (-4.3715)    (-3.7108)    (-3.6954)    (-2.4223)    (-2.4293)    
a4ir_good   -0.0060    -0.0109    -0.0089    -0.0004    -0.0058    -0.0069  
   (-0.5741)    (-1.0399)    (-0.8897)    (-0.0369)    (-0.5352)    (-0.6410)  
a4ir_good*factor   -0.0067    -0.0043    -0.0145    -0.0226    -0.0092    -0.0083  
   (-0.4020)    (-0.2580)    (-0.9114)    (-1.3251)    (-0.5309)    (-0.4887)  
Constant 0.0431 * 0.0617 ** 0.0314  0.0566 ** 0.0191  0.0385 * 0.0574 ** 0.0733 *** 0.0342  0.0502 ** 0.0110  0.0283  
 (1.8069)  (2.5368)  (1.3218)  (2.3337)  (0.8390) (1.6570) (2.3545) (2.9477) (1.3850) (1.9929) (0.4492) (1.1385) 
             
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3,297  3,303  3,297  3,303  3,297  3,303  3,297  3,303  3,297  3,303  3,297  3,303  
R-squared 0.0823  0.0755  0.1022  0.0929  0.1044  0.0987  0.0780  0.0719  0.0687  0.0643  0.0804  0.0749  
F 10.85  9.912  13.78  12.42  14.11  13.28  10.24  9.391  8.935  8.334  10.59  9.822  
